By Basim Ali
Writing about the causes of the Peloponnesian War (1), Thucydides identified fear, honour, and interest as the motivations that drove the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. These motivations were often difficult to manage through reason alone, and subsequent generations of political realists (2) have regarded this formulation as a lasting insight into the dynamics of interstate competition rather than just an explanation of a particular war. Twentieth-century strategic thought gave this a structure, and the Cold War produced the most elaborate attempt yet to manage Thucydidean motivations through deliberate design: a vocabulary of deterrence, signalling, and escalation control, developed by strategists such as Thomas Schelling (3) and Herman Kahn (4), that treated fear, honour, and interest not as forces to be eliminated, but as forces that could be communicated, calibrated, and contained. Kahn’s escalation ladder is perhaps the most prominent embodiment of this vocabulary; it imagined strategic competition as a climb up a sequence of rungs, ranging from ordinary diplomatic pressure to conventional skirmishes to full mobilisation and, ultimately, to nuclear war. The usefulness of this structure depended on each rung being a legible step that both sides could see themselves standing on together.
The India-Pakistan crisis (5) of April-May 2025 offers an opportunity to test whether this framework remains useful for understanding contemporary strategic competition. Following a militant attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’ against targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir on 07 May 2025. Over the course of the following four days, the two nuclear-armed neighbours engaged in a military confrontation that was marked by aerial engagements, artillery duels (6) along the Line of Control (LoC), and, for the first time, the exchange of hundreds of drones and loitering munitions (7). Nonetheless, the crisis remained below the threshold of all-out war, despite the unprecedented scale and sophistication of the military exchange, and it concluded with a ceasefire after four days.
The significance of this crisis lies not only in the role of drones and the changing nature of modern warfare, but also in the broader conceptual question it leads to: do contemporary strategic interactions still conform to the escalation models developed during the Cold War, or do those models describe only the boundaries of the system while providing comparatively less insight into how competition actually proceeds within them? The existing scholarship around emerging military technologies has largely focused on how they enable more precise and calibrated uses of force. Comparatively less attention has been paid to a related question: whether those same technologies also make the political meaning of coercive action harder for an adversary to interpret. The strategic logic inherited from the Cold War conceives escalation as movement along a ladder (8) towards conventional and potentially nuclear war. The 2025 India-Pakistan crisis demonstrates that contemporary strategic competition increasingly unfolds instead through persistent, calibrated, and technologically enabled interactions designed to signal resolve while avoiding uncontrolled escalation. The escalation ladder remains relevant, in the sense that it still describes the catastrophic outcome both sides continue to avoid, but it is no longer sufficient as the dominant conceptual model of how contemporary strategic competition is actually conducted.
Classical Strategic Thinking: Thucydides, Schelling, and the Escalation Ladder
Thucydides’ (9) account of the Peloponnesian War was more a historical narrative than a theory of escalation in the technical sense that later strategists would develop, but it identifies the raw material that any such theory must contend with: that state behaviour in moments of rivalry is driven by specific motivations, namely, fear of decline, concern for honour and reputation, and the calculation of interest. These motivations are not easily suspended even when the opposing sides can foresee that continued conflict serves neither. Twentieth-century strategic theory can be read as a sustained attempt to give structure to these Thucydidean motivations: if fear, honour, and interest cannot be eliminated, perhaps they can be channelled into forms of interaction that are legible enough, and costly enough, to prevent them from running to their most catastrophic conclusion.
Thomas Schelling (10) contributed to this endeavour by treating coercive bargaining as a problem of communication under uncertainty. According to him, the actors in a crisis are not simply calculating the balance of forces; they are also attempting to interpret each other’s intentions through actions whose meaning is not self-evident, and to convey their own intentions through actions aimed at shaping an adversary’s expectations. In such a framework, a threat or a limited use of force functions only to the extent to which it can be correctly interpreted by the party for whom it is intended. It is for this reason that Schelling placed such emphasis on the idea of a shared, recognisable focal point (11) that both sides could use to coordinate their expectations about where a confrontation was heading and where it would stop. This same logic was later formalised by James Fearon (12), whose work on audience costs (13) and costly signals argued that adversaries facing incomplete information about one another's resolve can only be reliably informed by actions or statements that would be expensive for a bluffing state to make. Both Fearon and Schelling advance the same underlying claim: signalling is credible when insincerity tends to be costly, and coercive bargaining depends on the receiving party's ability to tell the difference.
Instead of focusing primarily on the communication between adversaries, Herman Kahn (14) sought to conceptualise the structure through which escalation itself might unfold. He imagined strategic competition between nuclear-armed rivals as a ladder composed of dozens of rungs, ranging from diplomatic and economic pressure, limited military action to conventional war and, ultimately, nuclear exchange. The significance of the ladder stemmed not from the precision of an individual rung but from its analytical function. It provided a vocabulary through which escalation could be understood as a process of calibrated responses that signalled resolve without provoking an unintended jump to a much higher, more dangerous rung. Thus, the dynamics between the actors could be analysed not merely in terms of whether escalation occurred, but through their placement within an ordered sequence of increasingly intense interactions.
Since this vocabulary was developed, the underlying Thucydidean motivations, namely, fear, honour, and interest, have remained unchanged, and neither India nor Pakistan in the 2025 crisis behaved in a way that would have surprised Thucydides. What has changed is the technological environment within which Schelling's strategic communication and Kahn's rungs must now be read. The 2025 crisis therefore provides an opportunity to examine how well this framework captures the conduct of strategic competition under contemporary technological conditions.
The 2025 India-Pakistan Crisis: Contemporary Strategic Competition
The value of the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis for this argument lies not in its details as a discrete historical episode, but in the fact that it can be read against an internal benchmark drawn from the same interstate rivalry: the 1999 Kargil War (15), fought only a year after both countries declared themselves as nuclear powers. Kargil is the clearest case of Schelling's logic working roughly as intended. Pakistani forces occupied high-altitude positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), calculating that the nuclear overhang would deter a large-scale Indian response; India retaliated with a costly campaign of air strikes and infantry assaults, yet its forces never crossed (16) to the Pakistani side of the LoC, either on the ground or in the air, despite the apparent operational advantages this might have offered. In real time, Pakistan could observe that India was committing pilots and infantry to a campaign costly enough to demonstrate genuine resolve, while simultaneously declining to cross a specific and recognisable line. This conveyed a fairly precise signal about where India intended the conflict to stop. The credibility of the signal lay in the fact that the restraint itself was costly: an actor unwilling to escalate at all would not have accepted the casualties India accepted at Kargil, and an actor intending unlimited escalation would not have stopped at the LoC having already borne that cost.
The 2025 crisis followed a similar sequence of provocation, response, and ceasefire, but the character of the intervening exchange was remarkably different. Following the Pahalgam attack (17), India's Operation Sindoor (18) struck nine sites that New Delhi repeatedly characterised as terrorist infrastructure rather than Pakistani military facilities. The strikes were framed as ‘focused, measured, and non-escalatory’ (19) so that the calibrated restraint that Kargil-era signalling relied on could be transmitted. Pakistan's response, however, did not come through manned aircraft or ground movement but through waves of drones (20) targeting airfields, ammunition depots, and military cantonments in Indian-administered Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan (21). India's own retaliatory strikes on Pakistani air defence infrastructure similarly relied heavily on loitering munitions and stand-off missiles alongside manned aircraft. This exchange has been described as the first sustained drone battle ever fought between the two nuclear-armed neighbours, and it is specifically this aspect that represents a structural break from the Kargil pattern.
The break is as follows: at Kargil, the nature and extent of India's restraint were directly observable, because the actions that constituted that restraint, which peaks were retaken, which side of the line Indian aircraft flew on, how many Indian soldiers died doing it, could not easily be disputed after the fact. In 2025, by contrast, a considerable share of the crisis unfolded in a register where the basic facts themselves became contested (22) in real time: India and Pakistan offered competing accounts (23) of how many aircraft were lost, whose strikes caused which explosions, and whether particular targets were military or civilian. Following the exchange, a ceasefire was negotiated after four days of fighting through the long-standing hotline between the two countries' Directors General of Military Operations (24). This cessation of hostilities was faster than the 2001-02 standoff (25), but it did not resolve the interpretative gap. Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, both countries accused (26) each other of violating it, and the competing narratives regarding this persisted for weeks. Thus, the formal mechanism for stopping the shooting functioned; the informal mechanism for producing a shared understanding of what the shooting had meant functioned considerably less well than it had in 1999. The contrast between Kargil and 2025 lies in the changing informational environment within which strategic actions are interpreted.
Calibrated Coercion and Strategic Legibility
Deterrence theory (27) and the escalation ladder do not adequately capture the distinction between the restraint that was directly observable at Kargil and the restraint that had to be asserted, disputed, and repeatedly contested in May 2025. Both describe why a crisis stays bounded, but they do not explain why the same category of bounded action became harder in 2025 for either side to read correctly. What both sides were attempting was limited, calculated pressure meant to communicate resolve without triggering general war. This phenomenon is captured by the concept of ‘calibrated coercion (28)’. According to Cherian George (29), calibrated coercion involves the application of subtle and calculated pressure, rather than extreme violence, to maintain control at a low political cost. Samuel Charap (30) applies this concept in strategic studies to describe interstate behaviour, particularly Russia's approach to Ukraine after 2015 as a deliberate strategy of sustained, sub-decisive pressure rather than a rapid, overwhelming campaign. Despite the varied applications, the underlying idea remains unchanged: the deliberate use of limited pressure to influence an adversary's behaviour while avoiding the costs and risks associated with decisive escalation. The term does useful work by describing a real and increasingly common strategic posture in which states employ limited, technologically enabled pressure to influence an adversary's behaviour while deliberately avoiding decisive, uncontrolled war.
What the existing literature does not ask, and what the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis makes newly visible, is whether the adversaries can still read the calibration correctly. Calibrated coercion, as a strategy, functions as intended only if the target state can distinguish a calibrated action from an uncalibrated one: if it can observe a given strike, or a given package of drone incursions, and infer with reasonable confidence what the sender intended by it, and where the sender intends to stop. This is the same requirement Schelling identified as underlying all coercive bargaining, and that Fearon later formalised as the logic of costly signals, according to which a signal is credible in proportion to how expensive it would be for an insincere actor to send it. Calibration, when understood this way, is not simply the act of applying limited force. It is the act of applying force in a form specific and costly enough that the receiver can distinguish restraint from an unconstrained first move. This is precisely the condition that the technologies enabling contemporary calibrated coercion, namely drones, stand-off munitions, electronic warfare, cyber operations, and information operations, begin to erode. Each of these tools allows a state to calibrate the scale of an action with great precision while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the two things the receiving state most needs to interpret: authorship and intent. A loitering munition strike can be scaled with far more precision than a manned sortie, but it costs the sender almost nothing personally to launch, and its origin, target selection, and even its occurrence can be disputed after the fact in a way a manned incursion cannot. The same is true, in different registers, of cyber operations, whose attribution is frequently contested by design, and of information operations, which are calibrated as much for a domestic or international audience as for the adversary being coerced. The result is a strategic environment in which states are becoming more sophisticated at calibrating the scale of coercive action, and simultaneously less able to guarantee that the calibration is being read correctly on the other end.
The 2025 crisis illustrates this gap directly. India's insistence that Operation Sindoor was focused, measured, and non-escalatory was a textbook attempt at calibrated coercion in the classical sense: a signal of restraint alongside a demonstration of capability. However, the vehicle for that signal, precision strikes and loitering munitions rather than manned incursions, made the restraint harder for Pakistan to verify than India's restraint at Kargil had been, precisely because it cost India so little to make the claim. Additionally, Pakistan's own drone response was read by India less as a calibrated signal of proportionate retaliation than as an ambiguous mass event whose scale and intent had to be inferred rather than observed. Both sides were engaged in calibrated coercion in the conventional sense of the term, but neither could be fully confident that the calibration was being understood as intended. Thus, calibrated coercion has become an increasingly prominent feature of contemporary strategic competition, yet its technological enablers are quietly undermining the mutual legibility upon which it depends. Although it offers states greater flexibility than the escalation ladder in the application of force, it rests upon the same underlying assumption: that restraint remains mutually legible to the adversary. What the 2025 crisis suggests is that this flexibility has been purchased, in part, at the cost of legibility, and that this trade-off, rather than the mere existence of new technology, is the defining strategic problem of the contemporary period.
Beyond the Escalation Ladder
Kahn's ladder was never intended to be a literal prediction of how any given crisis would unfold; it was a heuristic, meant to provide policymakers with a shared vocabulary for placing an action's severity relative to the actions around it. Its usefulness depended fundamentally on the assumption examined in the preceding section: that both parties to a crisis could, with reasonable confidence, place a given action on the same rung, and could therefore use their own subsequent actions to signal whether they intended to climb further or to hold position. This assumption was plausible in a strategic environment dominated by manned aircraft, visible troop movements, and unambiguous territorial incursions, precisely the environment in which Kargil unfolded. Calibrated coercion, conducted through drones, stand-off weapons, cyber operations, and information campaigns, does not climb the ladder rung by rung in this respect. It operates in a register that is often laterally ambiguous rather than vertically discrete; a state can conduct an action that is simultaneously more intense in scale than the rung below it and less legible in kind, such that the receiving party cannot straightforwardly locate it on the ladder at all. The 2025 crisis demonstrates this directly: the volume of drone activity exchanged between India and Pakistan over four days would, translated into manned sorties or ground incursions, represent an extraordinary escalation by the standards of any prior crisis in the relationship; yet neither side treated it as an unambiguous climb up the ladder toward general war, in part because the ambiguity of authorship and intent made it difficult for either side to be certain how much of what it was witnessing constituted genuine escalation, feint, or purely domestic political theatre.
It is for precisely this reason that the escalation ladder remains relevant but insufficient, rather than having been superseded entirely. It still correctly identifies the outer boundary that both India and Pakistan continue to treat as inviolable, the nuclear threshold, and the fact that both sides in 2025 avoided any action that would credibly threaten that threshold suggests the ladder's top rungs retain real force. What the ladder does not capture is the texture of the vast middle space beneath that threshold, where most contemporary strategic competition, in South Asia and elsewhere, now actually takes place. That space is no longer well described as a sequence of rungs, because the technologies operating within it decouple the scale of an action from its legibility in a way the ladder's original rungs did not allow. A more adequate model would be needed to treat legibility, not merely severity, as an independent variable: two actions might occupy the same rung in terms of the damage they inflict or the resolve they intend to communicate, while differing sharply in how confidently the receiving state can identify which rung it is looking at. Contemporary strategic competition is therefore better understood as unfolding along two dimensions rather than one, severity and legibility, and it is the second of these, largely invisible to Kahn's original ladder, that the 2025 crisis brings into focus.
Policy Implications
The challenge of strategic legibility identified in this piece is unlikely to remain confined to South Asia. Drones, cyber operations, and information campaigns are becoming the default instruments of coercive signalling in other interstate rivalries, and there is no obvious reason to think the mechanism identified here is unique to this dyad. Whether it generalises as cleanly as it operated in the India-Pakistan case is a question this article does not attempt to settle; the aim here has been to establish the mechanism in a single, well-evidenced case. The practical implication is that crisis-management mechanisms built for an earlier, more legible era, namely hotlines, direct military-to-military channels, and third-party mediation (31) of the kind that helped bring the 2025 crisis to a rapid ceasefire, are likely to remain necessary but increasingly insufficient on their own. These channels can halt an exchange of fire, as the India-Pakistan hotline did within four days in 2025, but they are not well suited to resolving, in real time, the interpretive disputes over authorship, scale, and intent that calibrated coercion now generates.
In order to manage this issue, states will need to invest not only in the traditional architecture of crisis communication, but in the more specific and more difficult task of building attribution norms (32) and shared reference points (33) suited to unmanned and stand-off systems, an undertaking closer to rebuilding the legibility of the rungs themselves than to reinforcing the ladder that connects them. Without such norms, the danger in a future crisis is unlikely to be deliberate escalation by either side; it is more likely to be escalation that neither side intended, arrived at because one party's calibrated signal was read or misread by the other as something that it did not mean to send.
Conclusion
Thucydides identified fear, honour, and interest as the enduring motivations behind strategic rivalry, and they remain unchanged. What has changed is not the content of state motivation but the medium through which that motivation is expressed and interpreted. The vocabulary developed during the Cold War era was built to manage Thucydidean motivations under a specific technological condition: one in which the costs an actor incurred in carrying out an action served as a credible indicator of that actor's intent. Calibrated coercion, as practised in the 2025 crisis, retains the goal of that vocabulary, communicating resolve while avoiding uncontrolled war, but pursues it through instruments that allow states to project force with precision while remaining ambiguous about authorship and intent, precisely the two things a receiving state must correctly interpret. As strategic competition increasingly unfolds through the technologies of contemporary warfare, the scale of a coercive action is becoming progressively decoupled from its legibility. The assumptions that underpinned the strategic vocabulary developed during the Cold War therefore require renewed evaluation if they are to remain adequate for understanding contemporary strategic interaction.
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