Argentina at a crossroads: the 2023 General Election

Luca Venga

A country divided: introducing the Argentine election

Politics has never been as bewildering as it is today. Governments around the world have had to grapple with polarised electorates which can no longer be clearly divided and labelled into opposing camps of the left and the right. Gone are the days of simple bipartisan systems: the rise of candidates who dabble in identity politics has transcended class barriers, dragging a host of entirely novel issues into the political arena. Appeals to the masses and to ‘The Will of The People’ abound on all sides, pitting increasingly hostile factions against each other in ongoing ‘Culture Wars’ that unfold seamlessly across the digital and the physical realm.

But what is left when this supercharged cycle reaches its end, when extremism and violence are commonplace when dialogue is impossible and parties collapse under the weight of their divine-right leaders? What is left when everything burns out? 

The answer is Javier Milei. 

Javier Milei is bidding to be Argentina’s next President. He will face Sergio Massa, the current economy minister and Peronist candidate, in a run-off election on the 19th of November. This should concern people from all corners of the globe: the fact that a candidate like Mr. Milei has a robust chance of capturing the Presidency of a country like Argentina ought to raise alarm bells everywhere. 

Argentina is, in fact, something of a trailblazer as well as a bellwether, and insights into this complex country can be expanded and applied elsewhere. Javier Milei’s meteoric rise is, I believe, symptomatic of the malaise affecting many countries around the world, and thus it can offer us a glimpse at a possible future - a future we should all be invested in.

Days of a Future Past

Argentina was previously a laboratory for political innovation throughout the early 1940s. In those years, Juan Domingo Peron forcefully emerged on the national scene as a political innovator of the first order, upsetting the traditional system and generating an enduring kind of personality cult that still shapes Argentine society. 

Peron can be considered the first, true, modern populist – he commanded widespread support and linked his public and private images closely, mixing the conquering caudillo (strongman) with the benevolent father of the nation’s poor. His personal life spilled into the public, catapulting his second wife Eva Peron (affectionately known as Evita) to national and international fame. 

His economic policies escaped any attempt to be defined, and while they largely reflected a concern with the living conditions of the working classes, Peron ostensibly situated himself as the champion of a ‘third way’ between communism and capitalism, importing elements from fascist corporatism, resolutely sidelining socialists, and pursuing an international policy of strict non-alignment. 

Deposed in a military coup, exiled, and then returned triumphantly to the Presidency for a third mandate, Peron forcefully marked the history of the country and of the whole of South America, offering a blueprint for success that has been adapted and replicated in a variety of circumstances. The Peronist movement has dominated much of Argentina’s political life in the last fifty years, but its enduring appeal has been severely tested by a series of deep economic crises. 

Argentina’s twin nightmares: debt and inflation

It is hard to pin down exactly where Argentina’s economic fortunes began to decline – after all, at various points in the early 20th century, the country was amongst the most advanced and prosperous not just on the continent, but worldwide. 

The late 1990s, however, represented a decisive turning point. Argentina experienced hyperinflation and severe currency devaluation, culminating in the collapse of the Convertibility Plan in 2001, the default of the country’s sovereign debt, and a partial liquidity freeze. This crisis led to widespread social unrest, exemplified in the riots and protests that shook the capital at the turn of the millennium, a sharp increase in poverty levels, and a loss of confidence in the country's financial institutions. The subsequent years were marked by the government’s attempt to implement measures such as debt restructuring, fiscal austerity, and the introduction of a floating exchange rate regime in order to regain the trust of the international financial market and obtain loans from the IMF and other multilateral institutions.

These dynamics – acute crises followed by reconciliatory steps with external forces, which led to a temporary reprieve –played out somewhat cyclically until the onset of COVID-19. The pandemic shifted the equilibrium irreparably, exacerbating economic difficulties and precipitating thousands into poverty. Triple digit inflation broke any remnant of official exchange rates on the Argentine pesos, whose price on the black market is now spiralling inexorably downwards. 

Enter Javier Milei

Amidst such deep economic woes, compounded by the toxic legacy of the military junta, it comes as no surprise that Argentine politics are rife with antagonistic speeches, accusations of corruption or incompetence, and polarizing figures. 

In light of this background, many observers have made sense of Mr. Milei by labelling him as a scion of the Trump-Bolsonaro dynasty, the latest iteration of a phenomenon that has already been observed. They argue that he is but a product of his environment, that the confluence of populist politics and economic suffering was bound to produce such a figure, and that he is rising to fame by borrowing from the playbook of its Brazilian counterpart with an Argentinian tinge. 

Whilst there are certainly merits in such comparisons, I argue that Javier Milei is much more than this, and that he represents an evolution rather than a mere repetition – Like Juan Domingo Peron, he is the herald of a new type of politics. Like Peron, he has conjured a new political stance that is hard to describe or define, one that relies largely on a quasi-messianic belief in his own abilities and is light on specific details.

Self-describing as an anarcho-capitalist, Mr. Milei offers a vision that goes beyond any form of ideology and appeals only to raw, unfiltered emotion. There is no attempt to use reason or logic in any of Javier Milei’s speeches, to clearly propose policies that have been tried and tested or at least well-planned. Instead, preference is given to bold, headline-like statements of intent. 

Abolishing the Argentine central bank, replacing the national currency with the US dollar, legalising the trade of organs – these are only some of the points present in Milei’s programme. They are inflammatory, memorable, and radical. They certainly strike a chord with many frustrated voters who have seen savings wiped out and salaries stagnate and might be tempted by the promises of a fresh start: Mr. Milei, in fact, came first in the Presidential primaries in August, collecting about a third of all votes.

Symptomatic of his disdain for technocratic details, his proposed reduction of the corrupt, inefficient bureaucratic machine of the country is neatly summarised in rounded, impressive figures, but no explanation is ever offered as to how it can be achieved. 

Javier Milei further sets himself apart from conventional politicians by carefully cultivating a revolutionary and unconventional aura that I find reminiscent of Grigori Rasputin. Following in Peron’s footsteps, he amalgamates private elements of his life into his public image – stories abound, for instance, of tarot readings or the cloning of his late dog into five new puppies. His sister, like a modern Evita, is said to be his closest advisor and confidante and manages his political campaign. Were he to be elected, she would be his First Lady. 

His unabashed tirades against opponents or critics – ranging from Pope Francis to the centre-left mayor of Buenos Aires – further endear him to those far-right voters tired of political correctness and ‘woke’ speech. Sectors of the anti-global, anarchist left, meanwhile, are enthralled by the tantalising prospect of getting rid once and for all of the yoke put on the country’s shoulders by international financial institutions. The chief target of their rage is the IMF, with the Fund’s mammoth 44 billion USD loan to the government, the biggest in its history, is widely seen as impossible to repay. 

Mr. Milei finds strength in contradictions rather than being hampered by them. He is not disturbed by the schism separating his supporters, or by the incompatibility of some of his stances. He wants to open up the country to free trade but suggests withdrawing from Mercosur (a free trade bloc comprising Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). He is a staunch supporter of libertarian beliefs regarding one’s autonomy, but abortion rights do not seem to fall under this umbrella. while another politician might find it hard to explain this seemingly glaring paradox, Javier Milei cuts through such Gordian knots with a chainsaw – the chainsaw he was pictured brandishing at a political rally to symbolise his commitment to drastic cuts in public expenditure. 

In these regards, Javier Milei is unlike any politician I have ever seen take to the world stage. He bears more than a passing resemblance to the populism Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Juan Domingo Peron, and indeed borrows elements from these politicians and others besides. But he adds new ones and combines them in an unprecedented cocktail – a poisoned chalice he is offering to voters on the 19th of November. Should he succeed, imitators will take notes and contest elections across Latin America and beyond adopting his tactics and strategies. 

The way forward

The roots of populism grow deep, unnoticed until a leader such as Javier Milei emerges. In the case of Argentina, to understand the rise of such a peculiar, divisive figure, we have to acknowledge the nation's fraught political and economic history. There must be a reckoning with the legacy of Peron and Peronism, as well as increased scrutiny over the nature of domestic and international economic forces in shaping the political sphere. Politics itself should sever its links with populism in a bid to avoid becoming merely the unchecked tyranny of the majority. This is a global task for the century, one that will unfold in many different theatres – but in the case of Argentina, it is especially urgent. 

Argentine voters will be asked to choose in the upcoming weeks. Mr. Massa, for all the faults that can be attributed to him, represents a much more reliable and constructive alternative to Javier Milei. Were the latter to be elected, it is hard to predict what course the country would take – the reaction of international markets and a hostile congress might limit his scope for action, but much damage could still be wrought on the nation by a frustrated President Milei. 

Even if voters reject Mr. Milei, it is troubling enough that Argentina has been pushed this close to the edge of the precipice. 

Global actors from the IMF to neighbouring Brazil ought to be paying attention: they might learn that it is worth exploring new avenues for cooperation rather than sticking to outdated paradigms – those same paradigms that have reduced what once was the 6th largest economic power in the world to a country were about half of the population lives in poverty, that have transformed Buenos Aires from a global hub of the arts to a suffering metropolis where crime is rising and prices increase on a daily basis. 

The local and the international are coming together in Argentina, threatening to create a perfect storm. It is in everyone’s interest to follow this election closely, learning from it to avoid the worldwide rise of a new, uglier tide of populist politics that festers on the votes of the dispossessed, the discontent and the left-behind, tearing down any semblance of order or logic in favour of pure, distilled anger.

Sino–African Relations Going into COP28

Fikayo Akeredolu

The 28th UN Conference of the Parties (COP28) has already been plagued with various controversies. 

There has been displeasure about the climate conference hosted by one of the top producers of fossil fuels and issues relating to COP28 emails. These controversies should not detract from the importance of COP28, especially for countries in the Global South. For all the issues around the annual summit, it is still the largest multilateral forum for dealing with climate change. 

COP28 is of particular significance as it marks the conclusion of the first Global Stocktake, a comprehensive assessment of the progress made in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. A synthesis report of key findings showed that the world is far from achieving the Paris Agreement's goals. If action is not taken before the second Global Stocktake in 2028, we may witness the devastating reality of global temperatures soaring beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

For Africa, the situation is critical. Despite its limited contribution to climate change, Africa is the most vulnerable to its impacts under all climate scenarios above 1.5 degrees Celsius. There is a need for urgent multilateral action on mitigation and adaptation to prevent and reverse the consequences of climate change. Africa and its trading partners, of which China is top, must work at COP28 to find solutions adapted for the continent. 

China has the largest economy and is most influential in the multilateral sphere in the Global South. To what extent can it use this leverage to aid Africa’s negotiations at COP? President Xi has also pushed for increased south-south solidarity to help Global South countries multiply their impact on the world stage, ensure their representation in multilateral forums, and foster a fairer and more equitable international economic order. How will China translate this push into action for Africa at COP28?

Financing Adaptation & Mitigation 

One central theme that continues to arise in the climate conversation is the issue of financing for African countries to fund adaptation and mitigation efforts. To implement their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, African countries will need $2.8 trillion between 2020-2030. However, the continent only receives annual climate finance flows of $30 billion. At the recently concluded Africa Climate Week, African leaders demanded a scaling up of climate finance and operationalizing the loss and damage fund agreed on during COP27. 

China has featured heavily in the debate between Africa and Western nations over financial help to countries suffering the effects of climate change. During COP27 in Egypt, China lent its voice to support the demand of developing countries for a loss and damage fund from developed countries. China's then-special envoy for climate change, Xie Zhenhua, made it clear that China has no obligation to provide loss and damage funding. Still, he emphasised China’s willingness to support loss and damage efforts with other developing countries through Global South cooperation. He did not provide exact details, but China continues to push for South-South cooperation, which includes a climate cooperation fund. 

China has always pushed the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The idea is that developing countries (including China) should share responsibilities for developing and adopting information communication and scientific research while not incurring any economic burdens or requirements to reduce energy use.

Going into COP28 in the UAE, we can expect China to continue advocating for this principle.  As calls in the Global South get louder for changes to the multilateral financial system and accountability from their developed counterparts, concerted and targeted Sino–African cooperation could lead to the activation of the loss and damage fund. It could also push developed countries to fulfil their COP15 still unfulfilled pledge of $100 billion per year for climate efforts in developing countries. 

Discussing Africa’s Debt Crisis

Another critical area for assessing Sino–African relations going into COP28 is Africa’s worsening debt burden. 

Africa’s debt is at its highest level in over a decade. 49 African countries owe 39% of their debt to multilateral institutions, 35% to private creditors (excluding Chinese private creditors), and 12% of the debt burden on the continent is owed to China and Chinese lenders. As a result of COVID-19, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and soaring inflation, African countries have had to take on even more debt, and now 21 low-income African countries are either bankrupt or at high risk of debt distress. 

Climate finance has typically been offered through debt-creating means. Climate emergencies exacerbate these problems because they have little or no option other than borrowing to deal with recovery and reconstruction costs after an extreme climate event or environmental hazard. Using loans and other forms of debt to carry out climate financing will reduce a country’s capacity for fiscal stability and debt sustainability, thus worsening the debt crisis on the continent. This means many countries on the continent are struggling with limited monetary and fiscal space, compounding debt amid competing development priorities. 

In an ideal world, COP28 could provide a platform for Africa’s creditors to discuss resolving the debt issue without impacting mitigation and adaptation efforts on the continent. In January 2023, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated his country’s commitment to supporting the UAE’s goal of ensuring COP28 responded to “developing countries’ core concerns.”

Conclusion

Almost eight years after the Paris Climate Agreement was signed, the global community is not on track to meet its target of limiting global warming. Getting the Global Stocktake right is pivotal for COP28 and sets the stage for future stocktakes and climate action over the next decade. For China and Africa, which account for approximately 36% of the global population, the stakes are even higher as some countries already face climate change's consequences. 

As China’s President Xi continues to push for increased Global South cooperation, China’s willingness to push the agenda of countries in the region will be vital to achieving Chinese foreign policy goals. Going into COP28, Chinese and African negotiators have the opportunity to work together to push for funding for adaptation and mitigation without exacerbating debt issues.