The Necessity of Cluster Bombs in Ukraine’s Fight Against Russia

Autumn Perkey

At a café bombing on Oct. 5, 2023, 49 Ukrainians were killed. Ukrainian air defenses remain weak, and the continued Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure have damaged the electric grid and water supply in critical areas. Future aid packages need to be approved as swiftly as possible, and they should include any means necessary to defend against Russian adversaries, including cluster munitions. 

In July 2023, the U.S. sent a military aid package worth over $800 million, sent at a point in time when the Ukrainians were running out of options, including access to the necessary resources to defend. Amongst the aid sent, this included cluster munitions. Debates have arisen about whether the United States should send cluster munitions to aid in the fight against the Russian invasion. While there are considerable moral consequences and debates about their uses, Ukraine needs an aggressive aid package including the means to defend, which includes the use of cluster munitions. The aggression demonstrated by Russian forces warrants sending military aid packages that include any means necessary to assure Ukrainian defense, including sending the debated cluster munitions.

123 countries including the UK and Spain have outlawed cluster bombs, signing what’s known as the Convention on Cluster Munitions established in 2010, due to the potential harm to civilians. This can happen when the bombs land incorrectly or the fuse does not function properly. 

When the smaller bombs are released, they pose a risk of indiscriminately killing over a wide area. However, these bombs are not banned by the countries directly involved in the decision to use them, the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine. Russian forces have already been using cluster bombs in Ukraine, and the Russian counterparts have a failure rate of 30-40%. However, the failure rate of U.S. cluster bombs is only 1-2%. While there is a risk to civilians due to the potential failure rate, effective bomb damage assessment will help reduce these risks while providing necessary support against Russian atrocities. Balancing the use of cluster munitions with the protection of civilians is difficult, but in 2021 there were no reported deaths from initial cluster attacks. 

While effective bomb damage assessment may limit the collateral harm caused by cluster bombs, as of 2008 the United States has stopped producing them. Cluster munitions are not ideal against all targets, for example, standard unitary warheads are more effective against point targets like buildings. The use of cluster munitions by Ukraine has been limited in capacity. In their first use in March of 2022, Ukraine forces used cluster munitions near Husarivka, an agricultural village, near Russian military headquarters. During this strike, there were no reported deaths, and the target was a military one. In comparison, Russia has indiscriminately used cluster bombs throughout Ukraine leading to hundreds of civilian casualties. According to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) estimates between February to July 2022, there have been at least 689 civilian casualties due to cluster bombs most likely associated with Russia’s indiscriminate use or when used improperly within cities are densely populated areas.  

As of 2021 149 civilians were harmed by cluster munitions worldwide. This statistic focuses on their use in urban areas, where the overall risk of collateral damage is always higher and is not their intended use. Feedback from the frontlines has asserted that rather than using the cluster bombs indiscriminately, Ukrainian forces have been using them effectively and targeted to break through Russian defenses. The areas in which these bombs are being used are cluttered with Russian antitank, antipersonnel mines and trip wires focusing on a military target, rather than civilian infrastructure and populated areas. 

In Ukraine, the case for using cluster munitions is strong. According to U.N.-backed investigations, there is proof of significant Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The original airstrike in Mariupol in 2022 killed hundreds huddled inside a theater. Along with this are the numerous strikes Russia has repeated against Ukrainian infrastructure leading to leaving civilians without heat and electricity during some of the coldest months. These direct abuses against international law, do not even begin to account for the widespread use of torture towards non-combatants by Russian forces, including women and children. 

From February 24, 2022, to August 13, 2023, 26,384 civilian casualties have been reported in Ukraine. At least 9,444 civilians died during the Russian invasion as well as 16,940 being injured. While these are the known deaths and injuries, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights of the United Nations anticipates that the actual numbers are much higher. Numerous civilian atrocities have occurred justifying the U.S. sending the debated cluster bombs back in July of 2023. The continued Russian terrorism, such as the October 5 strike warrants future aid packages that contain any means necessary for Ukrainian defense. These atrocities are unacceptable and warrant the use of the extreme bombs that were sent. While cluster bombs are outlawed by 123 countries, the potential harm of inaction necessitates the risk taken. Further delays in military support through back stocked cluster munitions, will likely lead to more humanitarian abuses by Russian forces, including the torture of civilians. 

Overall, Russian cluster munitions fail 169-176% more than the counterparts sent to aid Ukrainians. The failure rate, meaning the likelihood of unexploded bomblets remaining after a cluster bomb is launched, has come back from Ukraine at 2.35 percent, while this is not at the expected threshold of 1-2%, it is still significantly lower than the cluster bombs being deployed by Russian forces (30-40% failure rate). While the UK, Spain, and Canada have spoken out against the U.S. decision to send the cluster bombs, Germany’s president has said that he understands the U.S. decision and it should not be blocked. While Germany still defends its position against the use of cluster bombs in general, the statement has been made that if Ukraine no longer has the means to defend itself, it will mean the end of the country. In the case of the U.S.-sent cluster bombs, the ends necessarily justify the means. 

Currently, the Ukrainians are halted from pushing back the Russian adversaries in the eastern Donetsk region. Valergy Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s military commander-in-chief has attributed the halt to a lack of adequate firepower to break through Russian defenses. Additionally, this effort has been supported by Ukrainian President Zelensky as much-needed military aid. 

Feedback from Ukraine as of July 2023 to the White House is that the cluster munitions were being used quite effectively to push back Russian forces. While it is unlikely this weapon alone will lead to a victory, the reality is that to counter Russian utility and capability these tools are a necessary means to an end. The additional limitations exist in the fact that there are no other readily available weapons to provide the type of support cluster munitions can provide. Currently, the supply of cannon artillery that acts similarly to a fuse is at an all-time low, as well as the supply of MLRS rockets (which are currently out of production and have been for some time). 

Within two weeks of the first cluster munitions aid package, the fighting in Kupiansk remained rough, but with the benefit of additional tools of warfare, Ukrainian forces were able to hold the line against the Russian forces attempting to seek territory by targeting Russian armored vehicles. Kupiansk has been undergoing a regular bombardment of Russian artillery for months and is at risk of civilian death and collateral damage if Russian forces continue their advance upon the city. Cluster munitions can be used to deter the takeover of the city and possibly prevent and deter Russian bombardment and abuses. 

Critics of the cluster bombs are dealing with a primarily moral dilemma while ignoring the implications of war. The Ukrainians are fighting to survive against an immoral force and need to match capabilities to protect Ukrainian civilians during a brutish invasion. The reality we face is a tradeoff between providing military assistance to a population that is being tortured, raped, and victimized, or allowing the adversary to maintain an upper hand. Providing military aid may often be limited by what munitions remain in stock, if that option is limited to cluster munitions, and they are used effectively, it is better than no support at all as a defensively Ukraine will lead to a stronger Russian opposition which has proven a threat to civilians and civilian infrastructure. 

Canada and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

michael levinson | News Editor

Former Canadian Senator Douglas Roche spoke bluntly on Canada’s refusal to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). “No wonder Canada didn’t get elected to the UN Security Council.”

Roche echoes a growing refrain that includes the New Democratic Party (NDP), Green Party, Bloc Québécois, as well as notable Canadian politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Jean Chrétien, all urging Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to sign the treaty. But Trudeau remains defiant. He deemed the UN conference which devised it “sort of useless,” instructed Canada’s UN delegation to boycott the negotiations, and continually asserts that Canada’s NATO membership precludes its participation.

Is it unbecoming for Canada — the nation which spearheaded the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and one of the most steadfast historical advocates for non-proliferation — to resist these pressures? Seventy-three percent of Canadians think so. But even for doves, the answer should be “no”.

The TPNW’s ban on nuclear weapons does not serve Canadian interests because it would weaken the US’ ability to deter nuclear threats that protects Canadians and democracies at large. Research suggests that when leaders ignore the TPNW it does little to quell public pressures to sign. Trudeau should plainly address Canadians and set the record straight. He should acknowledge that the broad-based effort to ban nuclear weapons is well-intentioned but falls short due to its potential to limit deterrence mechanisms that have helped avoid a nuclear winter. Finally, Trudeau should explain that an outright ban helps even the field for revisionist powers such as North Korea to take advantage of a potential nuclear void.

In this new kind of prisoner’s dilemma, the TPNW places a greater onus on democratic states to disarm than authoritarian ones. But ‘taking the high road’ is not admirable — it is reckless. Canada must instead regain credibility on disarmament by focusing its efforts on encouraging the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, aims to stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where they no longer pose a viable threat. To achieve this, state parties agree to never develop, transfer, or in any way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those that already have nuclear weapons must work towards their “irreversible elimination.” 

The TPNW can be seen as a good faith but idealistic way to deal with frustrations regarding the flagship treaty on nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A product of détente during the Cold War, the NPT permits the five UN Security Council veto states — the US, UK, France, China, and Russia — to keep their nuclear stockpiles with certain restraints. The rest give up their right to nuclear weapons entirely and agree to specific safeguards on nuclear energy. The NPT has been successful in limiting proliferation; there is an adage that most states comply with their treaty obligations most of the time. Overall, the NPT has made it less appealing and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the pace of nuclear disarmament has been abysmal. The US and Russia have a combined 11,000 nuclear warheads, enough to end the world many times over. However, “if the sole goal of the global nuclear order were to avoid nuclear use, the obvious solution would be abolition.” Rather, nuclear-armed states believe nuclear weapons provide security in a challenging strategic environment. For instance, Canada’s involvement in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NATO, place it firmly within the US’ nuclear umbrella. Security guarantees, like those given to Canada by the US, have been shown to reduce the possibility of a state otherwise acquiring weapons on their own. While the NPT still espouses complete disarmament as a goal, it is premised on the idea that a nuclear hierarchy among states, or a global nuclear order, “has done its part to help keep the world from going over the precipice.”

Some supporters of the TPNW maintain that though opposition to the treaty is predictable, its overall effect is to give rise to a ‘nuclear taboo’ that will become so powerful it will soon be customary international law. If this is the primary mechanism through which the world gives up on nuclear politics entirely, it is doomed to fail. Customary international law (which applies to all states irrespective of treaty obligations) does not develop simply when a practice is widespread. For it to materialize, it must also satisfy opinion juris: meaning a state is engaging in that practice because it is believed to be international law. As Chatham House opined, “this is far from an automatic process […] even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence — so-called persistent objectors — will not be bound by it.”

Other supporters of the TPNW concede that while achieving a complete ban of nuclear weapons is unlikely, a universal treaty that is not accepted by nuclear-weapons states is better than none. The University of Melbourne’s Maria Rost Rublee, for instance, argues that while the landmine ban treaty has not been ratified by the US, the US has not deployed them for two decades. In that case, the normative power of the treaty has superseded its lack of universality.

But landmines are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, their catastrophic effects are increasingly understood, mutually assured destruction looms large, and they are rarely embedded in conventional forces. Writing about Russia’s recent nuclear threats to Ukraine, Alexander Bollfrass said “fortunately, the foundation of international nuclear governance is more robust than is often assumed.” The NPT, for example, is complemented by various arms-control agreements, extended deterrence arrangements, and expectations of negative reinforcements like sanctions if nuclear norms are violated.

Given no nuclear-armed states have signed the TPNW, it will only serve to limit deterrence in practice. And as authoritarian states such as Russia and China are more immune to public pressures than democracies, it will primarily affect Western states’ deterrence capabilities. North Korea seems to have recognized this, voting in favour of establishing a formal UN mandate to commence negotiations for the TPNW in 2016. Kim Jong Un is taking advantage of our democratic processes — he is playing the West for a fool.

In several NATO countries, over 75% of respondents said they support the TPNW. If this support is translated in the ballot box, leaders will eventually give in. What would that mean? Contrary to what Justin Trudeau has claimed, there is a growing body of research showing that NATO members are not barred from signing the TPNW but must commit to giving up nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. So if a NATO member becomes a party to the TPNW, it would have to forfeit key defensive arrangements. Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, all host US warheads. While housing these weapons in Europe is a relic of Cold War strategy, “withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond.” And as the war in Ukraine continues, some say that the weapons can be used as leverage in negotiations with Russia.

Further, although Canada does not house nuclear weapons, the TPNW’s prohibition of its members to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party,” may undermine Canada’s involvement in NORAD. The NORAD air defense agreement is premised on the fact that regardless of the speed of the disarmament process, “large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long-range aircraft capable of striking North America.” This fundamentally practical alliance will be effectively destroyed by signing the TPNW.

Increasing public pressure on democracies to sign the TPNW also comes at a time when North Korea is testing longer-range ballistic missiles, Iran remains a threshold power on the precipice of a bomb, China is developing its nuclear triad, and Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities with state-of-the-art hypersonic glide vehicles. It is unwise to cede the upper hand. To re-establish Canada’s credibility on nuclear disarmament while avoiding the TPNW, therefore, Trudeau should encourage the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals. Or, as was suggested for Japan (which is facing similar pressures to sign), Trudeau should make it a priority to invest heavily in a specific aspect of nuclear security, such as improving safeguards on nuclear energy.

Whatever the response, Trudeau must not ignore the TPNW — it is here to stay and is only gaining more momentum. It would also be prudent to continue to engage with UN conferences and TPNW meetings to further demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment to multilateralism.

That means embracing Canada’s diplomatic tradition, responsibly.

Empowering India's Sustainable Development: The Crucial Role of Hemp

Khushi Maheshwari and Pratham Maheshwari

Humanity continues to endure catastrophic environmental damage. 2023 was the warmest year on record by far and the Doomsday clock is set at just 90 seconds to midnight. In such dire circumstances, even a glimmering hope can prove to be a blessing. Indeed, hope can be found at the literal grassroots in the form of a surprising commodity - hemp - in the world’s most populous country, India.

Hemp’s value can be best realized in a country best suited to become a world leader in its wider proliferation: India. Hemp has 25,000 proven applications ranging from textiles to food. It also flourishes without a heavy reliance on pesticides and fertilizers, and overall is a relatively low maintenance, and therefore agriculturally cost-effective, crop. Hemp can yield 3-8 tones of fiber in a single acre, 4 times that of an average forest while producing 25 times more oxygen. It is also a carbon-negative crop that absorbs carbon dioxide from the environment, with each kilogram of hemp absorbing 1.8-2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. It requires less than half the amount of water required to produce cotton, and rather than absorbing nutrients from the soil, hemp returns 60-70% of nutrients to the soil, promoting its future fertility. Hemp is also blessed with a brief crop cycle of approximately 12 weeks. One of the strongest natural fibers, hemp textile fiber is known to be biodegradable, hypoallergenic, antimicrobial, porous, durable, breathable, and comfortable, and can also help to regulate body temperature as it facilitates air to circulate around our skin when compared to other fabrics.

The global hemp fiber market is expected to reach 26 billion dollars by 2026 and the global medical hemp market is projected to exceed 82 billion dollars during the ensuing year. Capturing such a rapidly growing market and becoming a global leader in the industry  could do wonders for India. Hemp production is greatly needed to address issues such as unemployment, water scarcity, and limited availability of land; in the latter case, hemp has been heralded as a pristine candidate to repair damaged Indian soil through the process of phytoremediation.

Moreover, the use of hemp has roots in Ayurveda, a school of Indian alternative medicine. In the counterpart school of Atharvaveda, hemp is considered one of the five most sacred plants. Hemp was widely used in ancient India due to its medicinal and nutritional value. It was also used in textiles and even as hempcrete to construct the famous Ellora Caves, which has prevented their degradation for 1500 years. 

The regulation of hemp in India began during the colonial era when cannabis was restricted across British colonies. The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission (1894-1895) criminalized and suppressed cannabis cultivation and processing. Currently, hemp is regulated by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, of 1985, which was passed by the Rajiv Gandhi administration under the influence of the American Reagan administration for over two decades. The act legally defined hemp as cannabis due to the taxonomical origin of hemp flowers from the same family of plants as marijuana. This proved an impetus for taboos, myths, and misconceptions about hemp. Hemp, however, crucially lacks the psychoactive effects of marijuana when consumed. Marijuana arises from a female Sativa plant containing psychoactive tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that is consumed for recreational purposes. Hemp contains less than 0.3% THC. Still, the narrative of suspicion persists in the minds of Indian consumers.

The peculiar intensity of the Indian taboo against hemp is evinced by the country’s seemingly contradictory relationship to bhang, a plant prepared from the seeds and leaves of the cannabis plant, which is legal in India. Regulated by some states, it is used as a form of medicine and also enjoyed in festivals. Its origins trace back thousands of years when Cannabis Indica was used to worship Lord Shiva. A plausible explanation is that bhang is shielded from disrepute by its holy connotations. In a country imbued with strongly held religious beliefs and a strong commitment by many to India’s unique and storied traditions, hemp has slipped through the cracks, its rich heritage tainted by a perception imported from colonizers.

COP 28 recognised significant Indian environmental achievements, including progress toward a 33% reduction in emissions and the achievement of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets 11 years ahead of schedule. India has also greatly expanded its electric grid capacity, sourcing 80% from non-petrocarbon resources. However, COP 28 had nary a whisper about hemp. India is a land of manufacturers and businessmen who can capitalise on hemp, advancing environmental targets, bringing attendant international renown to India, and thereby building a pivotal point for India by making it a sustainable land and potentially generating a trillion dollar market for the Indian economy.

Legalization could be a first, normative, and positive step. Stereotypes must be combated by educating communities and spreading awareness. With widespread cultivation, India would not only benefit from an environmental surplus but also achieve economies of scale. A rational approach to structural change must, in this case, start at the top. However, the relationship between social narratives and policymaking is frustratingly circular, requiring courageous effort to break the chain of stigma and suppression of a potentially vital industry. 

Understanding the South China Sea Dispute through UNCLOS III, Nine-Dash Line and Philippines v. China

pragyan khare

Abstract

A hostage situation usually plays out like this: One party illegally takes control of an ‘entity’ while the other party is left helpless in the face of such violence, lacking any options to fight back or deter the opposing party. The innocent party is left to beseech a distinct third party, usually law enforcement, to ‘pull off a miracle’ and rescue them from this hellish situation. What if, however, the hostage situation plays out on a national level, with no real end in sight and a distinct lack of a powerful third party to ‘pull off a miracle?’ And what if the entity in question is not just a living person or persons, but a sea encompassing an area of around 3,500,000 km square, boasting of innumerable resources and is an economic boon to the affected party? That is exactly what the South China Sea is. This article attempts to dissect the South China Sea dispute through the perspective of the most proactive State in the region – China. The focus of this paper is a thorough evaluation of the conflict between China and Vietnam and China, and the Philippines as regards the South China Sea. This shall be done by evaluating UNCLOS III provisions in the region and the legality of the Nine-Dash Line by examining the Philippines v. China ruling. 

The Dragon in the Room - China

The South China Sea is of great importance to the countries in its vicinity, serving as a crucial source of income, hosting enormous fisheries which contribute 12% of the world’s annual fish harvest.[1] With vast untapped reserves of natural gas and oil, amounting to approximately 190 trillion cubic feet and 11 billion barrels respectively, it plays a pivotal economic role for the regional countries.[2] Handling $3 trillion in trade annually[3] and accounting for over a third of global marine traffic,[4] the South China Sea connects China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea to world markets.[5]

Consequently, the region has become a focal point of conflicting maritime jurisdictions, which elevates tensions and transforms the area into a volatile arena in conjunction with competing territorial claims. Despite relative peace in the early 21st century, recent events have pushed the neighbouring countries to take an antagonistic role towards the Middle Kingdom, risking a complete destabilization of the entire region and possibly the world at large.[6]

China asserts sovereignty over 80% of the South China Sea, including the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal.[7] This vast maritime claim extends over 800 nautical miles from the Chinese island province of Hainan, overlapping with territories claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines.[8] China’s vital interests in the South China Sea are underscored by the fact that over 80% of China’s energy imports and nearly 40% of its total trade passes through the region.[9] This strategic control of important shipping lanes aligns with China’s objective of global superpower status and access to vast oil reserves, crucial for the world’s largest energy consumer.[10] According to scholar James Kraska, the dispute fundamentally revolves around China’s pursuit of global power status and strategic hegemony over the region.[11]

Maritime security further motivates China’s aggressiveness, as ongoing disputes and escalating tensions have presented challenges for shipping.[12] Over 80 percent of China’s imported oil passes into the South China Sea via the Strait of Malacca.[13] Should the Strait of Malacca be closed down and used as a strategic chokepoint by China’s rivals, alternate routes for shipping would include either the Sunda or the Lombok Straits, adding not just weeks for the ships to reach other markets, but also using more energy to reach their destinations.[14] Thus, a closure would have far-reaching consequences for the oil-hungry State. This has been described as the “Malacca Dilemma”, the phrasing coined by President Hu Jintao, which refers to China’s vulnerability should the Strait be closed down and the lack of possible alternatives.[15] To counter such a disastrous possibility, China has resorted to militaristic belligerence in the South China Sea to avoid the likelihood of the “Malacca Dilemma” taking place, aiding in the Chinese rationale of claiming sovereignty over the South China Sea.

The ‘Nine-Dash Line’ is Beijing’s primary legal basis for its claims, dating back to 1946 when the Republic of China claimed the Paracels, Pratas and the Spratly Islands following Japan’s surrender according to the Cairo Declaration[16], which stated “[that] Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which they have seized…. and all the territories that Japan has stolen from China…. shall be restored to the Republic of China.”[17] In 1947, the Republic of China published a map featuring an eleven-dash line delineating the geographic extent of its authority in the South China Sea.[18] After the Communist victory in 1949, The People’s Republic of China adopted the claim[19] and simplified it to nine dashes for convenient demarcation.[20]

The ambiguity of the Nine-Dash Line paradoxically allows it to be one of the most potent tools in the Chinese arsenal. It allows for Chinese foreign policy to remain flexible, as, on the one hand, it can give way to a ‘soft’ approach when dealing with the ‘noisy neighbours’ by being treated as an imaginary concept envisioned only in maps. On the other hand, it allows Beijing to alternate to a ‘hard’ way by mentioning the Nine-Dash Line to indicate displeasure. Despite the prominence of the Nine-Dash Line, it is still considered a flimsy legal pretext which serves primarily as a cover for Chinese expansionism. Professor Clive Schofield highlighted its ambiguity, reasoning that it switches from being a claim to sovereignty over all the territory bound by the lines, to a unilateral claim, to a maritime boundary, and to a form of historic waters, intended to cause confusion as to how to tackle this Hydra of a policy decision.[21]

UNCLOS III and the Question of Law

In 1982, the United Nations held the third Conference on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS III).[22] Although the convention yielded no provisions to determine sovereignty over off-shore islands, it has numerous provisions directly relevant to the dispute and legally binding on all parties involved, as all claimants involved in the conflict are signatories of UNCLOS III. Not only did it clarify the breadth of a territorial sea to be up to 12 Nautical Miles[23], it also allowed for the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (hereafter – EEZ) extending up to 200 Nautical Miles from the baselines from which breadth of territorial sea is measured.[24] Within this EEZ, the State holds exclusive rights to exploit sea life and other natural resources.[25] In a departure from UNCLOS I, islands have an added caveat where they must be capable of sustaining human or economic life on their own.[26] Article 60(8) of UNCLOS III states that although a State has the authority to build and operate artificial islands within their EEZ, they are distinguished from ‘islands’ and thus have “no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ or the continental shelf.”[27] Additionally in the South China Sea, many features can be categorised as low-tide elevations, which are distinct from islands and defined under Article 13(1) of UNCLOS III as ‘A naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by water at low tide but submerged at high tide.’[28] Consequently, low tide elevations are not capable of generating maritime claims, just like rocks.

In 1996, China declared a series of straight baselines around the Paracels, from which its territorial sea ought to be measured, thus not only extending Beijing’s territorial sea claim, but also declaring all space within the baselines constitute its internal waters.[29] Thus, China claims the same rights as archipelagic States.[30] UNCLOS III, under Article 49[31], states that the “Sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines…..regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.”[32] The ruling laid down in the Philippines v. China (2016)[33] denied China the status of being an archipelagic State.[34] Article 47 of UNCLOS establishes basic rules, such as baseline segments not exceeding 100 Nautical Miles and the ratio of water to land enclosed by the baselines not exceeding the ratio of 9:1.[35] The Paracel baselines enclose 17,290 sq. km of water, while the land is only 9.11 sq. km in the Paracels.[36] The ratio is 1898:1. China wishes to establish a territorial sea in the Spratly Islands from artificial islands.[37] However, UNCLOS explicitly prohibits claiming territorial sea from artificial islands, making this a point of contention.[38] China also contends that it has the right to regulate military activity in its Exclusive Economic Zone, a stance not supported by UNCLOS.[39] Lastly, China’s interpretation of the territorial sea asserts that a State has the exclusive right to make, apply and execute its laws in that space without foreign interference.[40] Nevertheless, UNCLOS grants all ships the right of innocent passage through other states’ territorial seas.[41] The right to innocent passage was codified as customary international law in the Corfu Channel Case between the United Kingdom and Albania.[42] The ICJ held that due to the continuous use of the channel for centuries as a ‘practice of customary international law,’ the straits shall be considered an ‘innocent passage.’[43] The same can be said regarding the South China Sea, irrespective of what Beijing proclaims.

Analysis of the Conflict & Philippines v. China

International Law plays a contested yet undeniably relevant role in the South China Sea dispute,[44] where legal legitimacy holds considerable weight in consolidating political gains.[45] China’s actions in the region are intertwined with the question of their legality, and the potential international recognition of its claims would have far-reaching geopolitical consequences. Legal legitimacy is paramount to the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter – CCP). Legal legitimacy provides a framework for governance, fostering stability and public acceptance of their rule. It also helps in boosting international standing, as legal arguments regarding territorial claims strengthen their position on the world stage. This has prompted substantial efforts to research and present China’s legal and historical claims in the South China Sea.[46] Beijing contends that the Nine-Dash Line must be interpreted as a legitimate maritime boundary, and thus, within the line, China has the ability and legal backing to assert sovereignty over the island groups.[47] Thus, not only are the Chinese afforded the rights provided by UNCLOS, but China can assert its historic rights within the Nine-Dash Line, courtesy of Article 14 of China’s law on the EEZ concerning fishing, navigation and exploration of resources.[48]

To advance these interests, China has employed force to occupy islands or reefs, claiming sovereignty through occupation. This has heightened tensions, culminating in 2013 when Manila took the South China Sea dispute to an arbitral tribunal under UNCLOS due to China seizing the Scarborough shoal in Philippine waters and requested the panel to challenge the legality of China’s Nine-Dash Line and historic claims in the South China Sea.[49] The Philippines contended that China’s Nine-Dash Line violated UNCLOS agreements regarding EEZs.[50] China, refusing to participate in the arbitration process, insisted on bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes.[51] It published a position paper in 2014 arguing that the dispute was a matter of sovereignty rather than exploitation rights.[52] On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China’s Nine-Dash Line had no legal basis and China’s actions in Philippine waters violated International Law.[53] The court ruled that none of the territorial features in the Spratly Islands met the definition of an island under UNCLOS.[54]

China strongly criticised the ruling, saying that the verdict had contravened its ‘historical rights’ in the South China Sea, insisting it has had claims over the area for over 2000 years.[55] Analysts like Ian Storey outlined possible reactions – best, bad and worst. [56] China’s response to the ruling seems to be a mixture of the bad and worst ways, hardening its position and taking several unilateral administrative steps to augment its claims.[57] Coercion, rather than reconciliation, seems to have become the norm for Chinese tactics in the South China Sea. It has renamed 80 geographical features of the South China Sea[58] and established two new districts, Xisha and Nansha districts, in the southernmost Chinese province of Hainan to effectively administer South China Sea waters.[59] It has increased its coast guard and military activities in the disputed waters and continually harassed the other nations’ ships, claiming that the coast guard must enforce maritime law and protect China’s sovereignty.[60] A Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, entered Vietnam’s EEZ near the Vanguard Bank offshore oil block on 3 July 2019.[61] Despite Hanoi’s protests and receiving U.S. condemnation in August, China did nothing to indicate that Haiyang would soon return to Chinese waters. The ship would eventually return in October.[62]

Other States' initiatives to counter Beijing’s aggressive strategy have been lethargic and lacking a joint, determined effort.[63] Nonetheless, some punitive measures have been undertaken by the South East-Asian States against China. For instance, Vietnam passed legislation requiring foreign vessels to give prior information in territorial waters.[64] Needless to say, this too goes against UNCLOS III, of which Vietnam is a signatory. The Philippines, in 2011, renamed the South China Sea as the ‘West Philippine Sea’ in their official documents.[65] The Philippines, in particular, have gone closer in the U.S. sphere due to China’s intimidation tactics, with Washington D.C. seeing an opportunity to contain China and ensure that UNCLOS III is followed as international customary law. In 2014, the Philippines signed the ‘Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement’ with the U.S., allowing U.S. troops access to the Philippines’ ports and airfields and conducting joint military exercises.[66]

In World War I, Austria-Hungary’s actions escalated the conflict from a regional dispute to a conflict involving 2 Great Powers on opposite ends, which led to Germany joining the fray to tip the balance of power into favourable hands, leading to France joining Russia and Serbia to prevent a complete hegemony and the rest, as they say, is history. The South China Sea is a dispute eerily reminiscent of the Great War. All competing and rival States engage in extreme puffery, trying to outdo each other in displays of power and projecting strength on other claimant States. As history shows us, the cost of escalation involving Great Powers can quickly become too great to rationally bear.

Conclusion

The South China Sea dispute requires a peaceful resolution to uphold the territorial integrity and maritime sovereignty of China, Vietnam and the Philippines. It lies at the intersection of Public International Law and Municipal Law, questioning the legitimacy of unilateral determinations of national borders. Recognising the strong nationalistic sentiments tied to territory and sovereignty, historical precedent emphasises the need for caution and adherence to International Law.

China’s illegitimate expansion into the sovereign waters of Southeast nations is not only unwarranted but also illegal. As a global powerhouse, China should prioritise upholding international law rather than trying to tear it down. The Chinese State's violation of the right of innocent passage showcases China’s nonchalance towards breaking customary international law, treated as an imposition levied upon Beijing to prevent its meteoric rise to once again reclaim the ‘Mandate of Heaven.’ However, disregarding customary international law doesn’t make many allies in a globalised world.  

China’s forceful stance risks pushing regional nations further towards rival States, particularly the U.S. Should the Philippines continue to grow ever more swayed by Western promises of security, China can become geographically encircled on the Eastern side and lead to elevating the potential of conflict in the region. The situation may likely become like the Russia-Ukraine War, with similar casualties for the aggressor here. Just like Ukraine, the U.S. will not hesitate to send aid to the country being attacked by China to weaken their rival for years to come. This must be borne in mind by the foreign policy minds of the PRC. In a conflict often touted as the first domino in the build-up to a war to end all wars, compromise and equity must reign supreme. Foreign policy decision-making is a dynamic and cooperative process. It is the prerogative of both Beijing and the regional countries to collaborate and prevent unintended conflict escalation resulting from misconceptions.

Bibliography

Cases

The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19.

Statutes

Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

17 Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Plenary Meetings, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD. 1-2, 244 (1973-1982)

Online Articles

Turker Hasim, "Maritime Chessboard: The Geopolitical Dynamics of the South China Sea." Geopolitical Monitor, 24 August, 2023. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/maritime-chessboard-the-geopolitical-dynamics-of-the-south-china-sea/.

Center for Preventive Action, "Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea." Global Conflict Tracker, 26 June, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea/.

China Power Team, "How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea." ChinaPower, 2 August, 2017. https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-3073/.

Grady John, "Panel: New U.S. South China Sea Report Designed to Push Back Against Beijing’s Expansive Claims." USNI News, 22 January, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/01/25/panel-new-u-s-south-china-sea-report-designed-to-push-back-against-beijings-claim/.

Brown J Peter, "Calculated Ambiguity in the South China Sea." Asia Times, 8 December, 2009. https://web.archive.org/web/20100105111857/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KL08Ae01.html/.

Hannah Beech, "Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From." Time, 19 July, 2016. https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/.   

Tullio Treves, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." Audiovisual Library of International Law, 10 December, 1982. https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html/.

"Signatories for UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." The Danish Institute for Human Rights. https://sdg.humanrights.dk/en/instrument/signees/2487/.

"South China Sea: The Battle for Territory and Resources." Dryad Global. https://dg.dryadglobal.com/why-does-china-claim-south-china-sea>.

Mastro Skyler Oriana, "How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea." The Interpreter, 17 February, 2021. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea/.

Beckman Robert, "On the United States, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and US Freedom of Navigation Operations." Fulcrum, 5 August, 2022. https://fulcrum.sg/on-the-united-states-the-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-and-us-freedom-of-navigation-operations/.

Freund Eleanor, "Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide." Harvard Kennedy School – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June, 2017. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide#fn5/.

"The Dispute Over the South China Sea." Constitutional Rights Foundation. https://www.crf-usa.org/images/pdf/south-china-sea-dispute.pdf/.

Baker Rodger & Zhang Zhixing, "The Paradox of China’s Naval Strategy." Stratford Geopolitical Weekly, 17 July, 2012. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/paradox-chinas-naval-strategy/.

Torode Greg, "Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China Gathers Pace." Reuters, 27 September, 2013. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98Q0BX20130927/.

"China Says U.S. Trying to Influence Philippines’ Sea Case." Reuters, 24 July, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-china-usa-idUSL3N1043AM20150724/.

"China Releases White Paper to Refute Tribunal Verdict on South China Sea." The Hindu, 13 July, 2016. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/China-releases-white-paper-to-refute-South-China-Sea-tribunal-verdict/article60526986.ece/.

"Assessing Responses to the Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Perspective, no.43 (2016): 4-5. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/.

Books

International Chamber of Shipping. Maritime Security – A Comprehensive Guide for Shipowners, Seafarers and Administrations. (Witherby Publishing Group, 2021).

Journal Articles

Yoshimatsu Hidetaka, “China, Japan and the South China Sea Dispute: Pursuing Strategic Goals Through Economic and Institutional Means,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, vol. 4, no.3 (2017): 294-315. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602159/.

Herscovitch Benjamin, “A Balanced Threat Assessment of China’s South China Sea Policy,” Cato Institute, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04873/. 

Clingan Thomas, “Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III Environment,” Law and Contemporary Problems 46, no.2, 1983. https://doi.org/10.2307/1191517/.   

Macaraig Christine Elizabeth & Fenton Adam James, “Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation,” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, vol. 8, no.2 (2021). https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340.

Kanner Israel & Orion Assaf, “Maritime Claims on the Rocks: The International Arbitration Ruling on the South China Sea,” Institute for National Security Studies, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08530/.

Guilfoyle, Douglas. “The Rule of Law and Maritime Security: Understanding Lawfare in the South China Sea,” International Affairs 95(5) (2019): 999-1017. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3378904/.

Works Cited

[1] Hasim Turker, “Maritime Chessboard: The Geopolitical Dynamics of the South China Sea,” Geopolitical Monitor, 24 August, 2023, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/maritime-chessboard-the-geopolitical-dynamics-of-the-south-china-sea/.

[2] Center for Preventive Action, “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” Global Conflict Tracker, 26 June, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea/.

[3] John Grady, “Panel: New U.S. South China Sea Report Designed to Push Back Against Beijing’s Expansive Claims,” USNI News, 22 January 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/01/25/panel-new-u-s-south-china-sea-report-designed-to-push-back-against-beijings-claim/.

[4] China Power Team, “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea,” ChinaPower, 2 August, 2017, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-3073/.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Robert Beckman et. Al, Beyond territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources¸ Cheltenham: Elgar, 2013, 12.

[7] Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “China, Japan and the South China Sea Dispute: Pursuing Strategic Goals Through Economic and Institutional Means” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, vol. 4, no.3 (2017): 294-315. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602159/. 

[8] Benjamin Herscovitch, “A Balanced Threat Assessment of China’s South China Sea Policy,” Cato Institute, 2017. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04873/.   

[9] Supra, note 3.

[10] “South China Sea: The Battle for Territory and Resources,” Dryad Global, accessed 6 November 2023 https://dg.dryadglobal.com/why-does-china-claim-south-china-sea/.

[11] James Kraska, “The Nine Ironies of the South China Sea Mess,” The Diplomat, 17 September 2015 https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-nine-ironies-of-the-south-china-sea-mess/.

[12] International Chamber of Shipping, Maritime Security – A Comprehensive Guide for Shipowners, Seafarers and Administrations (Witherby Publishing Group, 2021).

[13] Supra, note 13.

[14] Supra, note 4.

[15] Paweł Paszak, “China and the Malacca Dilemma,” Warsaw Institute, 28 February 2021 https://warsawinstitute.org/china-malacca-dilemma/.

[16] Japan National DietLibrary, “Cairo Communiqué,” Birth of the Constitution of Japan, National DietLibrary, December 1, 1943, https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html  

[17] Ibid.

[18] Peter J Brown, “Calculated Ambiguity in the South China Sea,” Asia Times, 8 December 2009, https://web.archive.org/web/20100105111857/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KL08Ae01.html/.  

[19] Sourabh Gupta, “China’s South  China Sea Jurisdictional Claims: When Politics and Law collide.” EastAsiaForum, 29 July 2012, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/china-s-south-china-sea-jurisdictional-claims-when-politics-and-law-collide/.

[20] Hannah Beech, “Just Where Exactly Did China Get the South China Sea Nine-Dash Line From” Time, 19 July 2016, https://time.com/4412191/nine-dash-line-9-south-china-sea/.   

[21] Supra, note 6.

[22] Tullio Treves, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Audiovisual Library of International Law, 10 December, 1982, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html/.

[23] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 3.

[24] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 57.

[25] “Signatories for UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” The Danish Institute for Human Rights, accessed 5 November 2023, https://sdg.humanrights.dk/en/instrument/signees/2487/.

[26] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 121.

[27] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 60(8).

[28] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 13(1).

[29] “Reading Between the Lines: The Next Spratly Legal Dispute,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 21 March 2019, https://amti.csis.org/reading-between-lines-next-spratly-dispute/.

[30] Oriana Skyler Mastro, “How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea,” The Interpreter, 17 February, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea/.

[31] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 49.

[32] Ibid.

[33] The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 47.

[36] Supra, note 29.

[37] Supra, note 36.

[38] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 60.

[39] 17 Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Plenary Meetings, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD. 1-2, 244 (1973-1982).

[40] Supra, note 27.

[41] Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 art 17.

[42] Corfu Channel Case, (UK v. Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.

[43] Quincy Wright, ‘The Corfu Channel Case’ (1949) 43 American Journal of International Law.

[44] Douglas Guilfoyle, “The Rule of Law and Maritime Security: Understanding Lawfare in the South China Sea,” International Affairs 95(5) (2019): 999-1017. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3378904/.

[45] Christine Elizabeth Macaraig & Adam James Fenton, “Analyzing the Causes and Effects of the South China Sea Dispute: Natural Resources and Freedom of Navigation,” The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, vol. 8, no.2 (2021).

https://www.jstor.org/stable/48617340/.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Supra, note 7.

[48] Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, The Laws of the People's Republic of China (1983–1986).

[49] The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Greg Torode, “Philippines South China Sea Legal Case Against China Gathers Pace,” Reuters, 27 September, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE98Q0BX20130927/.

[52] “China Says U.S. Trying to Influence Philippines’ Sea Case,” Reuters, 24 July, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-china-usa-idUSL3N1043AM20150724/.

[53] Israel Kanner & Assaf Orion, “Maritime Claims on the Rocks: The International Arbitration Ruling on the South China Sea,” Institute for National Security Studies, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep08530/.

[54] Ibid.

[55] “China Releases White Paper to Refute Tribunal Verdict on South China Sea,” The Hindu, 13 July, 2016, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/China-releases-white-paper-to-refute-South-China-Sea-tribunal-verdict/article60526986.ece/.

[56] “Assessing Responses to the Arbitral Tribunal’s Ruling on the South China Sea,” Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Perspective, no.43 (2016): 4-5. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/.  

[57] Pratnashree Basu, “Sovereignty vs. Sovereign Rights: De-escalating Tensions in the South China Sea,” Observer Research Foundation, 14 August 2023, https://www.orfonline.org/research/sovereignty-vs-sovereign-rights-de-escalating-tensions-in-the-south-china-sea.

[58] Kristin Huang, “Beijing Marks out Claims in South China Sea by Naming Geographical Features,” South China Morning Post, 20 April 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3080721/beijing-marks-out-claims-south-china-sea-naming-geographical.

[59] “China’s Sansha City Establishes Xisha, Nansha Districts in Major Administrative Move,” CGTN, 16 April 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-04-18/China-s-Sansha-City-establishes-Xisha-Nansha-districts-PN5hyJkgFy/index.html.

[60] “China’s Xi tells Coast Guard to Enforce Maritime Law,” Reuters, 1 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-tells-coast-guard-enforce-maritime-law-2023-12-01/.

[61] Trinh Le, “The Vanguard Bank Standoff Shows that China Remains Undeterred,” The Interpreter, 16 August 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vanguard-bank-standoff-shows-china-remains-undeterred.

[62] “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes.

[63] Supra, note 57.

[64] Supra, note 62.

[65] Supra, note 63.

[66] Armando J. Heredia, “New Defense Agreement Between the Philippines and the U.S.: The Basics,” US Naval Institute, 29 April 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/04/29/new-defense-agreement-philippines-u-s-basics.

A Nexus of Strategic, Economic, and Humanitarian Importance: Djibouti and Sudanese Crisis

pratham maheshwari

Djibouti is a country of 23,200 square kilometres located on the Horn of Africa with a population of slightly more than a million people. It is also a member of the Arab League, the African Union and La Francophonie. Moreover, because of such a vast and diverse military foothold of other nations, Djibouti is also known as the ‘most valuable military real estate’ in the world. Various superpowers view the nation as being of vital strategic importance, inspiring engagement of a military and economic nature. In fact, military rent accounts for approximately 10% of Djibouti’s GDP. The recent Sudanese crisis opened the door to an altogether novel and noble dimension of cooperation in the humanitarian arena, necessitating a reappraisal of Djibouti’s presence on the radar of Great Powers. 

Djibouti’s economic and commercial relevance is largely premised upon its critical location on the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s busiest, at the entrance to the Red Sea. Goods transported from Asia to Europe through the Strait and the Suez Canal upstream must pass nearby the country. Roughly 10% of the world’s trade passes along Djibouti’s coast, within earshot of the coast. Great Powers such as the USA, France, Japan, and China have therefore been encouraged to establish military bases along Djibouti’s shores to compete for control of global supply chains.

Various other countries also utilise their military bases in Djibouti for fulfilling their own purposes. For instance, the USA has historically used its bases there as a means to conduct anti-terror operations. European states also perceive it as an imperative strategic base at the mouth of the sea. France’s military presence in Djibouti originates from the latter’s status as a French colony until 1977. After achieving independence, Djibouti signed agreements allowing France to maintain a military presence in the country in return for air protection and substantial rent payments. A nearby Italian naval base was built for anti-piracy and counter-terrorism purposes. The United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain rely on bases of their own for similar purposes. 

China had initially established its military base in 2017 as a means to conduct anti-piracy operations, but later, used it to assert its strategic influence over the region and include scarcely-resourced Djibouti in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative alongside its more resource-rich neighbours. Japan counters the Chinese presence with one of its own, with a particular eye to protecting its strategic interests in major Sea Lanes of Communication. India too is also gradually increasing its presence in the region as Saudi Arabia prepares to establish a base of its own. Russia is the only Great Power to have had its bid for a base declined at the insistence of Western powers. 

Djibouti’s dependence on the rents received from the world’s great military powers cannot be overstated. Its otherwise fragile economy is now being buttressed by heavy infrastructural investments for which it has accumulated a tremendous amount of debt. China has leveraged its position as a willing financier to pursue projects such as additional port development. Despite its financial vulnerability, Djibouti’s financial and security safety blankets are too lucrative to abandon.

The recent Sudanese crisis has introduced a novel use for the plethora of military installments in Djibouti. The USA had positioned its military forces there as a contingency in case of emergency. Just last year, MH-47 Chinook helicopters carrying elite Navy SEAL commandos rescued Embassy staff and relocated them to the American base in Djibouti. Japan dispatched two transport aircraft and an aerial refuelling aircraft carrying personnel, vehicles, and other equipment to its base in Djibouti as part of its own evacuation endeavours. Chinese naval ships carrying evacuees to Saudi Arabia's port also made a stop at their Chinese base in Djibouti. France, Italy, and Spain also used Djibouti as part of their evacuation efforts. Djibouti’s relative political stability within the Horn of Africa and proximity to war-torn areas facilitates its role as a ‘safe-spot’ to where evacuees can be transported. 

Djibouti has further proven a reliable player to various nations during tense geopolitical crises. The U.S. deployed a special crisis response team of Marines to its base in 2013 when the South Sudan conflict intensified. In 2016, when Japan had to rescue its personnel and citizens from South Sudan, a C-130 transport plane and land transport equipment were deployed to Djibouti. The base proved an essential hub for transportation and logistics support to Japanese peacekeepers of UNMISS during 2012-2017 due to Djibouti’s proximity to South Sudan. Moreover, medical aid was also provided from the base when terrorists attacked a natural gas plant in Algeria in 2013 during which 10 Japanese citizens were killed. In 2019, the Chinese also evacuated hundreds of citizens from Yemen and transported them to Djibouti as Civil War flared. Djibouti has been used as a platform for humanitarian efforts in the past, although sporadically. The ongoing Sudanese Crisis, however, and the many evacuation efforts so far conducted using the country as a base of operations demonstrate that a perception of Djibouti as a humanitarian linchpin has proliferated. 

The juxtaposition of foreign military bases in Djibouti can enmesh the government in a geopolitical playground. Opposing narratives and accusations of the government’s favouritism to certain nations over others do exist, but Djibouti has nonetheless managed to play powers off of each other to ensure political volatility does not compromise its core economic, security, and political stability. However, certain criticisms of Djibouti’s government are more widely held than others. The country is characterised by extreme poverty and unemployment with citizens lacking basic services, a reflection of a staggering inequality common among rentier states. Moreover, the government is under persistent criticism for its rampant corruption, human rights violations, media suppression, and tepid protection of civil and political rights. Hence, the disparity between the external and internal environment of Djibouti, in terms of stability, largely endures but not for long.

The Sudanese Crisis has illuminated Djibouti's multifaceted significance on the global stage. Beyond its traditional roles as a strategic maritime hub and economic gateway, Djibouti has emerged as a crucial player in humanitarian operations. The country's relative political stability and strategic location have made it a preferred destination for the evacuation and relocation of personnel and refugees from neighbouring conflict zones. Furthermore, initiatives of nations, including the deployment of military forces for evacuation missions, underscore Djibouti's newfound role as a humanitarian linchpin in the region. As countries recognize the necessity of securing and maintaining military installations along Djibouti's shores, the country's strategic importance is further emphasised. In navigating complex geopolitical dynamics and addressing emergent challenges, Djibouti continues to serve as a beacon of stability and cooperation in a volatile region, solidifying its status as a cornerstone of regional stability and security.

How Do Rebellions Succeed or Fail?

john connor

The panoply of factors affecting the success or failure of any single rebellion and the sheer number of rebellions throughout history makes identifying independent causes of success or failure a daunting task. Nevertheless, the challenge is worth accepting; once such overall causes are identified, other facets of rebellion – the role of atrocity, the causes of rebellion, or what elements must be present to start a rebellion – may be seen in a clearer light. 

“Rebellion”, in this essay, will be defined as an armed attempt to overthrow or expel the state by non-state actors, as with U.S. joint military doctrine’s characterization of insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” [1]. While some rebellions may seek simply to overthrow a government, some may regard the state itself as illegitimate. For the purposes of greater precision, this study excludes military coups, conflict involving organized crime (such as Mexico’s cartel conflict), or nonviolent state takeover by elite factions. This can help us achieve greater analytical precision as we proceed. 

This essay argues that rebellions can succeed in one of two ways: first, by achieving political concessions through a complete takeover of the state, or second, by state acquiescence to rebel demands. Neither scenario necessarily requires military victory. Both scenarios require four components - a weakened state, a partly sympathetic or neutral population, effective material and financial support, and a rebel movement capable of gaining some degree of legitimacy to administer a state, and material and financial support. It is important to note for the sake of clarity that sympathy is different from legitimacy; the former involves simple support for a rebellion’s ideals, while the latter involves recognizing it as a credible governing alternative to the state. 

Numerous other factors ranging from charismatic leadership to the presence of cross-border activity may strongly influence outcomes but do not necessarily have to be present for success. The path to success is also complicated by whether a rebellion involves domestic or expeditionary counterinsurgency by the state. Failure is possible through a lack of one of the essential components in either scenario, or because of other factors – it is easier for a rebellion to fail than succeed due to the state’s inherent asymmetric advantage over rebel movements. While the state always possesses a preexisting military, access to funds through taxation, and a governing structure, rebels must develop their own armed forces, political organization, and means of funding. One example of asymmetry is that state militaries will commonly possess superior technology and training to insurgents. This imbalance is often difficult but by no means impossible to overcome. 

Defining Success

Carl Von Clausewitz observed that war is “simply the continuation of policy by other means” [2]. Policy, for the rebel movements, means demands. These are not necessarily the same as the deep-seated structural grievances which cause revolts in the first place. Rather, they comprise the stated political objectives of the rebel movement. Success involves achieving these demands. This may fall along a wide spectrum from complete success (an example being American revolutionaries achieving independence) to complete failure (the destruction of Nat Turner’s rebellion and the subsequent imposition of even harsher slave laws) [3] to numerous gray zones in between. Success and failure, therefore, do not constitute a simple binary. There is no precise number of concessions to be gained that can make an insurgency an unqualified “success”. By placing individual insurgencies along a range rather than sorting them into discrete categories, we can avoid the problems that emerge when attempting to subsume the nuances of individual rebellions under rigid categorical guidelines. 

The success of insurgents in imposing their political goals is often, but not always, accompanied by military success. Like political success, military success falls along a wide spectrum, not necessarily corresponding to the spectrum of political success. At one end of the spectrum is complete victory – i.e., the expulsion of the enemy from the territory the rebels seek to control, or the destruction of the state and its replacement with a rebel regime; however, military victory can also occur in a more negative sense (exhausting and outlasting the state until it withdraws). At the other end of the spectrum, political success may still be achieved despite military defeat – Algeria is an excellent example. During the Algerian War of Independence, France mostly crushed an armed insurrection, only to give Algeria its independence after realizing that the colonial regime was unsustainable. Clausewitz further observed that war is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” [4]; in insurgency, the rebel has multiple paths to fulfilling their will, of which acts of violence are only one. 

Scenario One: Complete State Takeover

The first necessary factor is weakened state presence in the area of the insurgency. Insurgency is asymmetric by nature, and any state which completely succumbs to it must have existing problems of a political or military nature. Political problems often center around perceived lack of state legitimacy, which may be exacerbated by poor state control over remote areas (such as Pakistan’s tribal regions) [5], a proliferation of armed non-state actors (such as Lebanon’s sectarian militias) [6] and corruption [7]. Extant traditions of rebellion (such as Mali’s repeated Tuareg rebellions) [8] and the presence of minorities incorporated into the state against their will (such as Palestinians in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza during the First Intifada of 1987-1993) may also create fertile conditions for insurgency. Colonial states faced unique political challenges due to the difficulty of convincing their subjects to accept the legitimacy of an occupying power, in addition to the task of frequently administering vast geographic areas through small colonial bureaucracies. Factors affecting a weakened state presence frequently overlap with factors affecting military weakness: remote terrain or geographic distance between a state and its colony can reduce state military capacity, and military corruption can result in poorly equipped troops and low morale (as seen in the Nigerian military’s campaign against Boko Haram) [9]. 

The second necessary factor is a primarily sympathetic or neutral population. Neutrality is more important than sympathy; T.E. Lawrence, an influential figure in the study of counterinsurgency [10], claimed that only 2% of a population needed to be actively sympathetic for an insurgency to succeed [11]. Rebels will face inherent difficulties with establishing legitimacy over a population with an actively hostile majority; a neutral majority, however, can be persuaded. This is closely related to state weakness in that the neutrality of a population is often assured through their disillusionment with the state rather than sympathy for the rebels. In addition to previously discussed factors such as lack of legitimacy, such disillusionment may be provoked by state violence aimed at rebels (an example being indiscriminate bombing against Viet Cong insurgents by the US) [12]. Winning the sympathy of the population can sometimes be made easier through insurgents’ adaptation of an ideology capable of appealing to broad swaths of the population. An example might be Islamism in Afghanistan, where the anti-religious ideology of Communism failed to gain popular support. 

The third factor is an effective means of funding and support, the form of which can range from material supplies such as food, money and weapons to other forms of assistance such as sanctions and advocacy on the international stage. This is closely related to support of the population, following Mao’s dictum that “the people are like water and the army is like fish” [13]. More scholarly sources have also noted that external support is key for the insurgent [14]. Insurgents may also support themselves by exploiting natural resources (such as gold in the Sahel) [15] or engaging in organized crime (such as the Afghan Taliban’s exportation of opiates). Such activities become easier with the presence of a porous, poorly policed border area (such as Colombia’s border with Venezuela, the site of cocaine smuggling by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [16]. International support, especially but not exclusively from a cross border area, is also key. Obtaining support from an outside superpower is one of the easiest ways for insurgents to overcome their asymmetric disadvantage regarding the state (the American supply of missiles to Afghanistan’s Mujahideen being a classic example) [17]. 

Fourthly, the insurgents must be capable of establishing some degree of legitimacy over the territories they take. This is crucial because the destruction of the state will not necessarily lead to the insurgents imposing their political demands – it may simply lead to general anarchy if the insurgents are unable to establish control. For example, during Liberia’s civil war, multiple rebel factions succeeded in ousting the regime of Samuel Doe, only to fight each other in a chaotic civil war afterwards [18]. The standard for rebel groups establishing legitimacy is not as high as the standards for states – for instance, Taliban insurgents faced competitors in their own territory such as ISIS-Khorasan – but at least some degree of control must be established. An objection to this point is that some rebels may suffer military defeat and loss of their territories yet still eventually take over the state (again Algeria comes to mind), raising the question of why establishing legitimacy over territory was ever important for ultimate victory. The answer is that establishing an effective alternative to state rule – even temporarily – is a key method of weakening the state in the eyes of the population and lessening the confidence of the state’s rulers in their own ability to stay permanently in power, thereby opening a path to eventual political change. This is especially true if a rebel movement can demonstrate that it is more effective at governing than the government itself. 

While all four of the above factors must be present for any rebellion to succeed, numerous other elements can contribute to insurgent success in this scenario. These include the presence of experienced or charismatic leaders, effective propaganda, and most notably, military victory. It is possible for rebels to take over a state despite military defeat – as previously mentioned, this occurred in Algeria. However, this scenario requires significant military and financial exhaustion on part of the state – France only gave up Algeria after expending enormous amounts of blood and treasure. A more common scenario – observed frequently in expeditionary counterinsurgency – is for rebels to fight the state to a stalemate and then wait for it to withdraw to take over the colony, sometimes due to regime change at home (Portugal’s colonial wars in Mozambique and Angola are examples of this). Outright military victory on the battlefield is more difficult to achieve due to asymmetry (this may be increasingly true of modern warfare due to advances in technology) – however, examples do exist, such as the French army’s 1954 disaster at Dien Bien Phu [19] at the hands of Viet Minh insurgents. 

A word must also be said about the differences of scenario one in counterinsurgency’s domestic and expeditionary varieties – fighting an internal insurgency (for instance, Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion) vs fighting an insurgency abroad (for example, the U.S. fighting insurgency in Iraq, or imperial European powers fighting rebellions in their colonies). The complete takeover of the state by rebels is more easily achieved in expeditionary situations. Overthrowing a domestic government is typically difficult due to the state’s superior power, often requiring a significant loss of public legitimacy or support by the state. In contrast, expelling a colonial state or foreign invader only requires the domestic government’s withdrawal. Domestic insurgencies are also more likely to require regular warfare to achieve the goal of state capture, whereas expeditionary insurgencies can simply wear down the state through irregular warfare until it withdraws (though this does not preclude the possibility of regular warfare, as seen again the example of Dien Bien Phu) [20]. 

Why might rebels fail to achieve victory in a scenario one? A lack of any of the four crucial factors may be fatal. Some states may simply be too strong to take on: the Soviet Union faced no successful armed rebellions in its history, and few occurred inside of the Russian core (as stated earlier, our framework does not include nonviolent state takeover by elite factions – ie, the peaceful secession of republics from the Soviet Union). Lack of a sympathetic or neutral population can also doom an insurgency, as Che Guevara discovered when he failed to gain the support of Bolivian peasants in 1967 [21]. The anti-Castro Escambray Rebellion in Cuba is a case study in perils of lacking funding or support; insurgents were isolated by government forces in the mountains and unable to receive outside resources [22]. Failure to establish legitimacy also a fatal obstacle; Myanmar’s anti-junta insurgency has been hampered by rebel failure to establish a unified alternative to the government [23]. Adverse but not necessarily fatal factors can involve foreign intervention against domestic insurgency (for instance, the US support of South Vietnam’s government against the Viet Cong), lack of advanced technology, and situations in which support for the rebellion is confined to a small minority group within a country, against which ethnic or racial prejudices can be mobilized (see for instance Saddam Hussein’s weaponization of Arab identity against Iraq’s rebellious Kurdish minority) [24]. 

Scenario Two: State Compromise

First, the state must be weakened both militarily and through the loss of legitimacy, but not to the same extent as it must be in scenario one. Since this scenario does not require rebel capture of the entire state, the state does not need to be weak overall; it only needs to be weak at projecting force into a particular physical geographic area. If it fails to control this area, it may be forced into conceding to rebel demands. This is commonly seen in expeditionary counterinsurgency, such as those of empires struggling to maintain control over remote colonies (the French, Dutch, British, and Portuguese all being examples). Rebel forces in expeditionary counterinsurgency may often gain an advantage through the utilization of impassable or intractable terrain unfamiliar to colonial powers [25]. Another example is the desert region of northern Mali during the 1990-1995 Tuareg separatist rebellion. The central government’s failure to control the area forced it to compromise with the rebels by integrating them into the military and bringing their leaders into government [26]. 

Likewise, this scenario requires sympathetic or neutral civilians, but unlike cases of total state defeat, they need not comprise a majority, since only one segment of the country needs to be controlled (an example being the insurgency waged in southern Sudan by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, resulting in the eventual independence of South Sudan in 2011 following a 2005 ceasefire and negotiations) [27]. Ideologically, crafting a message that appeals to the entire population of the state may not necessarily be as important for this reason. Another example is the first Iraqi-Kurdish War of 1961-1971. As the Kurds were a minority, most of Iraq’s population was not sympathetic to their cause. As the goal of the Kurds was secession, not regime change in Iraq as a whole, they did not need to overthrow Iraq’s central government, but only to maintain control of their own territory. Kurdish leaders were able to obtain a compromise by the state in the form of an autonomous region after government forces proved themselves unable to exert control over Iraq’s Kurdish regions [28]. 

The issue of funding and support is mostly the same in this scenario: any rebel group will need access to arms, food, and funding regardless of its scope. Since this scenario again does not include taking over the state and only requires rebel control over a single area, it is possible that less funding is necessary, though it is important to be cautious on this point – rebels will still need enough support to inflict substantial military losses on the state, as gaining enough leverage to impose their demands without taking it over is quite difficult. It is tempting to think that this scenario represents an easier path to rebel success; in actuality, it simply requires a more difficult balancing act. Neither scenario is necessarily preferable for the insurgent; either might be suitable depending on the situation. 

Lastly, scenario two still requires a rebel movement capable of establishing a certain degree of popular support and legitimacy. While such legitimacy does not necessarily need to include international recognition (for instance, Somaliland has achieved de facto independence without this), it is critical for rebels to be seen as a viable alternative government – for instance by collecting taxes, enforcing laws, and performing other basic functions of the state within the territory they control. The challenge of compelling an unwilling state to negotiate concessions requires that the state has an organization to negotiate with. If the state faces a plethora of disunited rebel movements with competing claims to the population’s loyalty, they may be less likely to engage in dealmaking with any individual group. While the existence of rival groups does not necessarily preclude this process, it is vital that there be a single most prominent group capable of being seen as the primary representative for rebel demands. 

As in scenario one, military victory is unnecessary in this scenario. Forcing the state to the negotiating table does not require a decisive victory on the battlefield; it merely requires convincing the state that making concessions is more efficient than continued warfare. This can often be done through wearing down a conventional army using guerilla warfare; thus, regular warfare in this scenario is even less likely to be necessary than in scenario one. Insurgents can also target the state’s population as the center of gravity in this scenario, by encouraging them to view the conflict as unjust or unwinnable and put pressure on the state to end it. 

Other auxiliary factors in success are symmetrical to both scenarios one and two. Outside or cross border support may be particularly important as a supporting factor in this scenario, since it centers on putting pressure on the state to change its course – international pressure on a state can be highly effective (for instance, sanctions against Sudan and aid to rebels from international organizations during the Darfur genocide) [29]. High levels of international support do not necessarily translate into victory, however – Myanmar’s rebels have yet to gain victory despite longstanding sanctions placed on the country’s military junta for its atrocities [30]. 

Failure, like victory, lies on a spectrum. Rebellions may descend into protracted, low intensity conflict with the state, with no clear path towards military or political victory; such was the result of FARC’s 52-year insurgency against the Colombian government [31]. Another pitfall is that because this path to victory requires securing only part of the population’s support, that part of the population can be more easily isolated and repressed by the government – for instance, the mass internment of South African Boers by the British. In the case of expeditionary counterinsurgency, rebels may face greater difficulty convincing an authoritarian state to negotiate as opposed to a democratic state, or in turning sympathy among its population into an advantage; Portugal, under the authoritarian Estado Nuovo regime, was the very last nation to give up its African colonies. Rebels may also be unable to exhaust the state and force it to the negotiating table if the state is being supported by an international ally – the failure of El Salvador’s Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front to overcome a government adamantly supported by the U.S. being a prime example [32]. 

Conclusion

Success in insurgency consists of achieving political goals, which means either replacing the state to implement said goals or convincing the state to give in to some of them; neither requires military victory. In both scenarios, rebels must take advantage of state weakness, have a population which is at least partly supportive or neutral, demonstrate a degree of legitimacy, and have effective means of funding and support. A lack of any of these key factors may quickly doom an insurgency, which perpetually faces an inherent asymmetric disadvantage compared to the state.

Citations

[1] Glenn, “Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube”, 43.

[2] Clausewitz, On War, 19.

[3] The Nat Turner Project, “Laws Passed”

[4] Clausewitz, On War, 17.

[5] Jones, Lessons from the Tribal Areas, 38-42.

[6] Schwarz & de Corral, “States Do Not Just Collapse and Fail”, 216.

[7] Dix, Hussman, & Walton, “Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Fragility in Fragile Situations”, vii.

[8] Lecocq & Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, 432-433.

[9] Onuoha et al, “Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency”, 406-415.

[10] Oxnevad, “Beyond a Desert Revolt”, 1051.

[11] Sloan, Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction, 79.

[12] Kocher et al, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War”, 216.

[13] Katzenbach &Hanrahan “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung”, 328.

[14] Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 83-102.

[15] International Crisis Group, “Getting a Grip on Central Sahel’s Gold Rush”, 2-3.

[16] Boraz et al, Ungoverned Territories, 258-261.

[17] Westermann, “The Limits of Soviet Airpower”, 82.

[18] Kieh, “Irregular Warfare and Liberia’s First Civil War”, 72.

[19] Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”, 178.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Kruijt, “Che Guevara and Guerilla Warfare”, 6.

[22] Brown, “The bandido counterrevolution in Cuba, 1959-1965”, Nuevo Mundo [Online]

[23] Lumbaca, “Sequencing Burma’s Resistance: A Three Phase Approach to Defeating the Junta”

[24] Voller, “Identity and the Ba’th Regime’s Campaign Against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq”, 390-394.

[25] Walter, Colonial Violence, 23-27.

[26] Lecocq & Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, 427.

[27] BBC, “South Sudan Becomes an Independent Nation”

[28] Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq, 18.

[29] Reno, “Complex Operations in Weak and Failing States: the Sudan Rebel Perspective”, 115-119.

[30] David I. Steinberg, “The United States and Burma: a ‘Boutique’ Issue?” 181-187.

[31] Lee, “The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?”, 28-30

[32] Rabasa et al, Money in the Bank, 44.

Bibliography

Books

Glenn, Russell W. Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Translated by J.J. Graham. London: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997. 

Jones, Seth G. “Lessons from the Tribal Areas” in The Long Shadow of 9/11: America’s Response to Terrorism. Edited by Brian Michael Jenkins and John P. Godges. RAND Corporation, 2011. 

Sloan, Elinor C. Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction New York: Routledge, 2017.

Byman, Daniel et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001. 

Boraz, Stephen et al. Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Walter, Dierk. Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of Force, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 

Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Iraq: the Past, Present, and Future. Pluto Press, 2007. 

Rabasa, Angel, et al. Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Paper 4, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007. 

Journals, Think Tanks, and Websites 

 “Laws Passed”, The Nat Turner Project, accessed November 27, 2023 https://www.natturnerproject.org/laws-passed. 

Schwarz, Rolf and de Corral, Miguel. “States Do Not Just Fail and Collapse: Rethinking States in the Middle East”. Democracy and Security, 7, No. 33 (July-September 2011), 209-226. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602689 

Dix, Sarah, Hussman, Karen, and Walton, Grant. “Risks of Corruption to State Legitimacy and Stability in Fragile Situations”. U4 Chr. Michelsen Institute. No. 3, May 2012. 

Lecocq, Baz, and Klute, George, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali”, International Journal, 68 No. 3 (September 2013), 424-434. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709398 

Onuoha, Freedom C., et al. “Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle”. Security Journal, 33, No. 3 (September 2020): 406-415, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6. 

Oxnevad, Ian. “Beyond a Desert Revolt: T.E. Lawrence’s Theory of Proxy War and State Creation”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 45 No. 12, 1050-1068. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1723283. 

Kocher, Matthew Adam, et al. “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War”. American Journal of Political Science, 55, No. 2 (April 2011): 216. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025046. 

Katzenbach, Edward L., Hanrahan, Gene Z. “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung”, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 70, No. 3 (September, 1955). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2145469?sid=primo&origin=crossref. 

International Crisis Group. “Getting a Grip on Central Sahel’s Gold Rush”, International Crisis Group, 2019, 2-3. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep31267.4?seq=1. 

Westermann, Edward B. “The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989”, School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University: Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama, 1997. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA391797.pdf. 

Kieh, George Klayt Jr. “Irregular Warfare and Liberia’s First Civil War”, Journal of International and Area Studies, 11, No. 1 (June 2004). 

Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict” World Politics 27, No. 2 (January, 1975). https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009880. 

Kruijt, Dirk. “Che Guevara and Guerilla Warfare”, Globalizations Published Online April 24, 2022. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2022.2066055. 

Brown, Johnathan. “The bandido counterrevolution in Cuba, 1959-1965”, Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [Online], 20, no. 6 https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.71412. 

Lumbaca, Lumpy. “Sequencing Burma’s Resistance: A Three Phase Approach to Defeating the Junta”, Small Wars Journal, accessed December 2, 2023, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sequencing-burmas-resistance-three-phase-approach-defeating-junta. 

Voller, Yaniv. “Identity and the Ba’th Regime’s Campaign Against Kurdish Rebels in Northern Iraq”, Middle East Journal, 71, No. 3 (Summer 2017). https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/90016470.pdf. 

Reno, William. “Complex Operations in Weak and Failing States: the Sudan Rebel Perspective”, Prism, 1, No. 2 (March 2010). https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26469045.pdf. 

Steinberg, David I. “The United States and Burma: a ‘Boutique’ Issue?” International Affairs 86, No. 1 (January, 2010). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389093?seq=7. 

Lee, Chris. “The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?”, Latin American Perspectives, 39, No. 1 (January 2012) https://www.jstor.org/stable/23238966?seq=3. 

What Russia’s 2022 “anti-propaganda” laws mean for the embattled LGBTQ community

Joshua Robinson

On 24th November 2022, a bundle of bills packaged as ‘anti-gay propaganda’ measures passed their third reading in the state Duma and were swiftly signed into law by President Vladimir Putin. This development represented a significant expansion – and hardening – of the vaguely-worded 2013 laws which have seen activists fined and imprisoned, and been linked to a sustained trebling in violent anti-LGBT crimes across the Russian Federation.

The scope is significantly farther-reaching than the infamous 2013 ‘anti-gay’ law. The caveat that limited restrictions to ‘distribution of propaganda to minors’ has been removed, effectively criminalising the expression of pro-LGBT sentiment. Public same-sex expression of any type – from lectures and concerts to hand-holding – fall under the remit of the restrictions if carried out in a space where others are present.

The consequences are personally and financially ruinous. Individuals can now be fined four times the 2013 legislation of up to 400,000 roubles (c. 5200 USD), equal to around a year’s average salary in Russia. Organisations can face a bankrupting 10 million rouble penalty (c. 132,000 USD), ten times higher than the mandate of the preceding legislation. 

Repeat offenders and those who use “media” to “propagandise non-traditional relations” face jail-time of up to five years. This is an unprecedented development in Russia’s post-communist history which echoes the imprisonment of around 60,000 gay men in the Soviet Union under Stalinist anti-sodomy articles. Not only has the severity of the laws increased, but the authorities have indicated how seriously they are prepared use them: in 2022, there were more prosecutions and convictions for ‘propaganda’ than any year since 2013.

These laws underpin an evolving and increasingly state-led approach to sexual minorities with a political motive. Off the back of these laws, other repressive policies have been brought to life, advancing through a ban on Trans gender-reassignment surgery (June 2023), reports of conversion therapy at private clinics, and the designation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ as an ‘extremist organisation’ (November 2023). 

Origins

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pumped kerosene into parliament's determination and creativity when it came to repressive laws. Passing anti-LGBT laws with accompanying rhetoric had a well-established and successful precedent in Russia, and LGBT is viewed as a risk-free and politically salient scapegoat. As early as July 2022, Communist Party deputies had proposed curbing ‘childfree’ lifestyles and the promotion of “non-traditional sexual orientations.”

Targeting the LGBT community gels perfectly with the Kremlin’s narrative of Russia as a bastion of ‘traditional’ values, an ideological and political alternative to a decaying and decadent West. For parliamentarians seeking political clout and perhaps a career boost, formulating laws against “non-traditional sexual relations” goes down particularly well with the Presidential administration if framed within the context of Russia’s demographic crisis. The (mistaken) belief that clamping down on homosexuality will ameliorate cascading birth rates persists among many in Russia’s political class. 

However, the timing and focus of the laws – which explicitly merge ‘non-traditional relations’, homosexuality, ‘propaganda’, gender-transition and paedophilia into a usefully adaptable hydra that seeks to destroy Russia’s morality and demographic stability – are a reaction to events in Ukraine. Passionate speeches decrying the corruption of children and demographic threat of same-sex relations were televised as a distraction from Ukraine’s recapture of Kherson city last autumn. The criminalisation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ comes at a time of stagnation across the front and, and many polls show a dip in active support for the ‘Special Military Operation’.

LGBT, therefore, makes an excellent scapegoat. The Kremlin can score almost guaranteed approval rating victories by tapping into the homophobic climate in society that it has helped to cultivate. A 2020 Levada poll revealed that 18% of Russia’s population said that they wanted LGBT people ‘eliminated’, down from 21% in 2015.

Impacts

‘Non-traditional relations’, in conjunction with November’s ban on the ‘international LGBT movement’, continues a trend of vague language used in Russia’s discriminatory legislation. This absence of clear definitions is a strategic device that allows Russia's authorities to apply the laws as they see fit and fosters a culture of fear among Russia’s queer citizens. Even before the law was signed, publishers scrambled to censor literature that referenced same-sex relationships. One video posted on the RUSSIA NEXT Telegram news channel shows a new copy of Max Falk’s ‘Shattered’ with references to same-sex relationships blocked out. Several publishers, such as Popcorn books, are now under investigation by the authorities for ‘propagandising’ same-sex relationships. The ‘cancel culture’ that propaganda professionals like Olga Skabayeva adore to admonish in bombastic talk shows has become most overt in post-war Russia itself. 

Telegram remains a haven for queer activist, social and dating groups, as do a variety of international gay dating apps, though Russia has taken steps to makes these less accessible.  Queer activist spaces such as St. Petersburg’s Действия still run their lectures underground, and some of those most public of queer spaces, gay bars, remain open – though, as I noted on a trip in February, the already slimmest of rainbow flags has been replaced with neutral branding.

It is still possible to have a life as an LGBT person in Russia, but that life is increasingly difficult. The rise in prosecutions for propaganda shows that the authorities are ready to pursue people for a crime that are not fully defined. The hounding of activists and police raids on queer clubs in Moscow and St. Petersburg – some of which have since been shuttered – reinforces the legislative message that ‘you are not welcome here.’ To live as a gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, or queer person in the Russian Federation today means increasingly suppressing your identity and maintaining an increasingly high degree of self-censorship in public spaces, whether that be speech and dress, to public expression of affection. LGBT people will still form networks and social groups, but these will shift increasingly from private to secretive spaces as public – including digital – spaces are increasingly surveilled. 

It is not the anti-propaganda laws on their own that are suppressing the lives of Russia’s queer citizens in such a devastating way. Rather, a new state approach to sexual minorities and the instrumentalisation of a cumulative buildup of discriminatory legislation, annihilation of trans rights, designation of a host of LGBTQ charities and support organisations as ‘Foreign Agents’, increasingly vehement rhetoric in and out of parliament, and a tolerance for anti-LGBT violence by those in positions of power is shaping Russia in a way that is putting the lives of queer citizens at risk. Those that have the means to leave have done so or are in the process: but most LGBTQ citizens do not have this option. The West has been reluctant to accept Russian applications for asylum in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though this has shown tentative signs of changing in recent weeks in the wake of new laws against sexual minorities in the country.

If stagnation in the war continues, or should things take a turn for the worse for Russia’s armed forces, LGBT people may become scapegoated in more sinister ways. The Russian state has already indicated its willingness to use legislation to boost approval-ratings in the face of political difficulties. What is changing, however, is the implementation of legislation beyond exemplary cases and bombastic parliamentary speeches. Political homophobia is being translated into serious action not only against prominent activists and protesters, but non-activist LGBT citizens – including under-18s – and commercial establishments. The political homophobia of an increasingly militarised and war-ready Russia may well grow into something more centralised and systematic, should the Kremlin’s ‘Special Military Operation’ fail to secure victories it cannot sell at home. 

Artificial Intelligence is this Generation’s Jurassic Park

Janani Mohan

The day before November 30, 2022, was a normal day—artificial intelligence was a growing problem that many knew nothing about and most ignored. Then, OpenAI dropped an early version of ChatGPT. Within five days, the AI-based bot garnered one million users. With ChatGPT pioneering the way to the “AI revolution,” AI became better, faster, and more accessible than ever before. While GPT-1 was a barebones model that demonstrated what AI could be, subsequent versions leading up to the current GPT-4 served up that potential with improved models, increased data points, and higher-skilled, human-like capabilities. But in the midst of this, one question is just starting to get asked—is this revolution good for humanity, or could it be this generation's “Jurassic Park”?

Soon after the release of ChatGPT in the mainstream, organizations became the first to regulate it. Companies prevented staff from using AI in their work due to security risks and inaccuracies, and universities established that using AI on exams was cheating. These responses all prevented the use of AI in specific circumstances but did not consider more broadly if and where AI development should be constrained. In the United States, it became a question for the government to deliberate. Over the past year, the U.S. Congress has held multiple hearings on AI, but these hearings proved challenging due to the government-technology gap. Congressmembers often struggle to meaningfully discuss the dangers posed by AI, because they still need to learn more about what AI is to understand what it can do.

This government-technology gap serves as a prime example of the fundamental paradox of AI governance: tech companies can but won’t; governments can’t but need to. Tech companies are developing new AI products and expecting the government to regulate them; governments do not understand AI enough at this point to set such policies. Tech companies are fast-paced and turn around updates every few months; governments are slow and need more time to formulate and authorize policy. AI is a major opportunity for many tech companies; governments treat AI as one of numerous emerging issues that they need to respond to. The problem with this paradox is that tech companies are the only ones currently capable of thinking through whether certain upgrades to AI are beneficial to humanity but are often too lost in their excitement of what can be done to think about what should be. 

Considering how best to govern AI must therefore be treated as a serious and compounding issue. Recent AI development includes attempts to create stronger capabilities and greater sentience, and these two factors coupled together could prove dire. The framework for understanding AI sentience includes four levels: reactive machines where AI responds, limited memory where AI learns from limited feedback, theory of mind where AI understands human emotions, and self-awareness where AI can have its own emotions in response. While only the first two currently exist, as AI progresses and gains more autonomy, it could gain theory of mind and self-awareness, or at least processes that mimic these two. This is a problem considering that AI could have a theory of mind that “rationally” determines the best course of action, but whose system of rationality is based on faulty ethics that lead it to cause harm.      

Beyond this futuristic, yet fast-approaching issue, even in its current state, AI can cause problems when used incorrectly or without proper oversight by humans. Because AI learns from limited feedback, AI can currently recognize patterns and provide recommendations that treat these patterns as causal, ignoring broader nuances. And, even when AI does its job correctly, AI is only as good as the data that is inputted into its algorithms, which means that faulty datasets can lead to faulty conclusions. For example, the use of AI in predictive algorithms for crime has led to racial bias issues in decision-making by police forces and legal systems, due to poor datasets and treating demographics incorrectly as a causal factor. 

Although the potential for where AI can go next is still uncertain and many decry sounding alarm bells too early, a helpful reminder is that many thought what ChatGPT could do was just a future possibility, or even the plot of a futuristic sci-fi movie, before November 2022. And yet, that future is here: AI is proving to be this generation’s Jurassic Park, where tech companies advance AI without fully considering its potential downsides. AI that follows human controls is AI that can be regulated. But, if AI stops responding to human controls, much like sentient dinosaurs, or utilizes poor datasets and logic, it could be a problem that is no longer solvable. To put it simply, the future of artificial intelligence could shape the future of our planet. And, governance must respond to AI immediately, like it's a bunch of man-eating dinosaurs that could forever change the world—before it does.