By Charles Petrik, January 26, 2026
The United State’s recent forced extradition of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, as a part of “Operation Southern Spear,” was justified by US authorities on the basis of their alleged involvement in the Cartel de Las Soles. They now face charges related to drug trafficking in the US. This operation has precipitated a sudden leadership transition in Venezuela and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to projecting a renewed Monroe Doctrine-style power in the Western Hemisphere, including ongoing attacks on boats accused of smuggling drugs and the seizure of five oil tankers as a part of their ongoing maritime blockade.
Whether Maduro and Flores ultimately face imprisonment or exile is expected to be determined over the course of 2026; however, their return to Venezuela is widely regarded as politically impossible. In response to the operation, adversaries, the UN, and several members of the EU have all been critical, arguing that the operation constituted a violation of international law. These legal challenges are likely to unfold over a long period of time and remain in tension with Maduro’s establishment and its well-documented human rights violations, which continue to affect the country.
Since the operation, the US has shifted its focus toward “fixing” and profiting from Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, straying away from explicit promises to promote democracy or provide humanitarian aid. While this demonstration of American military power and continued economic pressure represents a major flashpoint in the region, it is unlikely to reduce drug deaths in the US, produce a democratic transition in Venezuela, or generate substantial economic returns for Washington. Nevertheless, it does present an opportunity for the US to embrace values-based persuasion, reengage with regional partners and build stability that will exist past the Trump administration.
US Goals Are Unlikely to be Accomplished
Maduro’s regime represents a continuation of the Chavez-era political order, where political repression and economic patrimonialism dominated the country. These dynamics have contributed to the mass migration and persistent human rights violations. Colonel Mark F. Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argued that the United States currently faces “two competing goals: U.S. reimbursement and Venezuela’s well-being” which are largely incompatible as long as Maduro’s establishment remains in power.
The Interim President and Maduro loyalist, Delcy Rodríguez recently expressed her desire to work with the US in order to maintain “balance” while previously exclaiming that “Venezuela would not be ‘a colony of an empire’.” Often described as ideologically rigid and politically savvy, Rodríguez is likely to prioritise deterring further external intervention and maintain stability in the country. Doing so is predicated on managing a complex web of state armed forces, the civilian colectivo militias, the FARC and the ELN, which threaten to fill a potential power vacuum.
Governance
Prevailing opinion suggests that the US has no intentions to pursue an immediate pro-democratic transition, rejecting the opportunity to work through the opposition in the short term. The next National Assembly elections are scheduled for 2031, while presidential term limits remain effectively unconstrained. In the meantime, the country will be run by Rodríguez, her brother Jorge Rodríguez, who is the renewed president of the National Assembly, and Vladimir Padrino López, the Minister of Defence, who has served since 2014. With the Maduro regime entrenched, US-Venezuela relations are likely to be shaped by a mutual accommodation of interests: economic payoff for the US and preservation of power for the establishment in Venezuela.
Above all, the fundamental structure of the Venezuelan state will remain the same without elections that facilitate a democratic transition. Recently, there have been reports of citizens being arrested for celebrating Maduro’s capture under a new decree that allows the arrest of "any person involved in promoting or supporting the armed attack by the United States of America against the territory of the Republic.” As the ruling establishment perceives itself to be increasingly threatened, the risk of expanded state control, repression of dissent, and restrictions on free expression is likely to intensify.
Drugs and Oil
Although the US administration justified their recent operation as an attempt to limit the activities of the Cartel de Las Soles, designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), the removal of Maduro is unlikely to produce a measurable reduction in drug consumption or deaths in the United States. Venezuela functions primarily as a transit country, and the majority of the fentanyl entering the US comes through Mexico. Additionally, the motive to reintroduce US investment into the country’s oil resources is a much longer, dangerous and conditional process than suggested by the Trump administration.
Venezuela has the world’s largest known crude oil reserves; however, sanctions, corruption and instability have reduced its exports by two-thirds in the past two decades. Oil accounts for most of the country’s national revenue, with 80% of recent exports directed toward China, largely as debt repayment for $10 billion accrued by Venezuela during Chavez’s rule. While the US blockade has restricted shipments globally, the absence of a clear mechanism through which Washington could compel sustainable market control leaves the repayment of China’s interests uncertain.
While market speculation in Venezuela’s oil industry has increased following the incursion, major firms such as Exxon recently signalled that the political and security situation in the country must improve for there to be any profitable enterprise. Defiance from Venezuelan officials, the presence and capabilities of internal opposition groups, and lack of security and economic guarantees significantly constrain the prospects for productive and safe investment. The hopes for extraction on the US’s terms are low in the near future and risks further conflict without a dedicated security force and humanitarian attention to support bottom-up development. In fact, with the opening of this volatile and instable market, it may encourage less-qualified investment and operations that further threaten sustainable and ethical extraction of oil in Venezuela, furthering humanitarian and ecological risk.
Potential Paths Forward and Implications
More productive routes moving forward would include a range of multilateral partnerships, potentially including Colombia and Brazil that could help mediate a democratic transition or future elections. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signalled that need for cooperation in his recent NYT op-ed, where, despite the stifled tone, he rebuked the US’s operations. The current US strategy was recently outlined by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. The initial phase, stabilisation, is said to involve the quarantining of tankers and seizure of sanctioned oil, up to 50 million barrels. The US plans to sell this seized oil and use the revenue to support the Venezuelan people, broadly defined. However, this “revenue” would come from frozen Venezuelan assets rather than directly from newly generated income. The subsequent stage would focus on recovery, meaning to advance American interests in resource extraction, free political prisoners and restructure civil society. Secretary Rubio then proposed a final transition stage that would seek structural or democratic reform in the future. However, these proposals remain under-specified and lack credible implementation mechanisms.
With recent threats toward the sovereignty of Greenland and a new conflict brewing with Iran, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use military action at the global scale, and on multiple different fronts as a tactic of coercion, as opposed to values-based persuasion. In Venezuela, this approach risks provoking or alienating other great powers, including Russia and China, which are unlikely to directly act out, but may see their growing influence in South America threatened by a neo-Monrovian United States. Russia has formally condemned the operation while China characterised it as a “typical act of bullying, a serious violation of international law, a severe infringement upon Venezuela's sovereignty, and a grave damage to the rights of the Venezuelan people." Although only 4% of China’s oil imports coming from Venezuela, continued US pressure may generate broader normative and geopolitical repercussions in relation to their interests. In reaction to the incursion, China has positioned itself as a moral voice in the UN Security Council despite economic and military coercion of their own, while Vladamir Putin could be further emboldened to draw out the war in Ukraine.
Embracing an “America First,” unilateral approach to establishing foreign interest and power, the US risks further isolating allies in South America, diluting its influence in other strategic theatres, and marginalising humanitarian and legal precedents that are essential to any sustainable relationship with Venezuela. However, Washington retains the capacity to protect its interests by reengaging in a persuasive, not coercive logic, that values working with regional partners to multiply political and economic leverage while rebuilding regional capacities in the process. Persuading a democratic transition is the most direct way forward to a safer, humanitarian Venezuela, but is a long-term, tactful pursuit, considering the multiple nodes of power currently operating in Maduro’s state structure.
Any positive intervention in Venezuela must therefore involve a carefully sequenced transition of power which engages multi-lateral pressure with a coordinated diplomatic approach. This would prioritise short-term relief and an internalisation of democratic norms to help promote eventual stability and “rule-consistent behaviour” in the country. Relaxing sanctions for humanitarian relief is potentially the path of least resistance for the US, if seeking long-term stability and mutual benefit. No matter what, any effective transition in Venezuela will be prolonged and fragile. Ultimately, sustainable democracy depends on oversight by actors without short-term extractive interests; otherwise, US methods will continue to undermine its own goals for regional engagement.
