SARAH CAO
Introduction
On 6 November, the Oxford Taiwan Studies Programme at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies hosted Professors Chung-min Tsai and Yen-pin Su from National Chengchi University for a seminar exploring the changing dimensions of Taiwan’s global role. Professor Tsai’s presentation, “From Power Politics to Norms: Theoretical Reflections on Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry and East Asian Security,” examined how Taiwan’s chip industry reflects a broader evolution in international relations. Professor Su’s talk, “Democratic Support and Public Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice Policies in Taiwan,” analyzed how public opinion and democratic values shape the pursuit of justice in post-authoritarian societies.
Together, their research portrayed Taiwan at two interlocking frontiers: the high-tech economy that anchors regional stability and the moral framework that sustains its democratic legitimacy. While their topics appear distinct, both examined how Taiwan’s institutions and ideas reinforce each other in shaping the East Asian order.
The Geopolitics of Semiconductors
Professor Tsai began by framing Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as a “testing ground” for international relations theories. Through a realist lens, he noted that chips are strategic commodities whose control confers geopolitical leverage. Taiwan’s technological dominance, anchored by TSMC’s dominant market share in advanced chip manufacturing, creates a form of strategic dependence for major powers.
From a neoliberal perspective, Tsai argued that the semiconductor supply chain exemplifies how cross-border cooperation matters. Companies such as ASML, NVIDIA, and TSMC participate in an intricate global network of design, equipment, manufacturing, and advanced packaging. The CHIPS and Science Act and the proposed CHIP 4 Alliance reflect the US’s effort to institutionalize supply chain security. Tsai described this as a “new form of collective security,” one that redefines national defense through economic interdependence and industrial policy rather than troop deployments or military alliances.
Constructivist theory, he explained, offers a third lens. Taiwan’s reputation as a reliable chip producer has become tied to its democratic identity. It conveys moral leverage, allowing Taiwan to frame itself as a responsible global stakeholder rather than merely a pawn in great-power competition.
Yet, Tsai cautioned against overreliance on this metaphor. For Beijing, he observed, “the Taiwan issue is about sovereignty, not about economic development.” Economic deterrence can delay conflict but cannot displace deeply rooted political imperatives. He argued that although the likelihood of war in the short term remains low, strategic uncertainty persists because Taiwan’s economic centrality also makes it a potential pressure point.
Tsai situated these theories within the political economy of semiconductors, a global industry valued at 610 billion USD in 2023. Taiwan’s central role within this system is anchored by TSMC, which holds more than 50 percent of the market for advanced chips and continues to lead in manufacturing and advanced testing and packaging.
Despite its success, this concentration carries risk. “Global demand for trusted chips enhances deeper partnerships for Taiwan,” Tsai explained, “but strategic overdependence invites coercion.” Diversification is theoretically desirable, but replicating Taiwan’s cluster of technical expertise, industrial coordination, and governance capacity is empirically difficult. Tsai cited TSMC’s global expansion plan—with new sites in Germany, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan—as an attempt to balance resilience with continued efficiency. While Taiwan dominates advanced manufacturing, its dependence on raw material imports and energy stability remains a structural vulnerability.
Democracy and the Politics of Memory
While Professor Tsai examined Taiwan’s external security, Professor Yen-pin Su turned inward to analyze its democratic foundations. His research investigates how citizens’ democratic values shape support for transitional justice (TJ) measures.
Taiwan presents a unique case among late democratizers. Although its transition from authoritarianism occurred in the late 1980s, comprehensive transitional justice efforts were not institutionalized until the Transitional Justice Commission was established in 2018. Su argued that this time lag provides a valuable lens for understanding how democracies mature after consolidation, when memories of repression are more distant and public attention shifts to new political and economic concerns.
Drawing on data from the 2022 Taiwan Democratic Value and Governance Survey (N=1,264), Su examined how individuals with stronger democratic support respond to different transitional justice policies. He defined “democratic support” as a diffuse commitment to regime-level principles such as rule of law, political equality, and government accountability, rather than short-term satisfaction with incumbents. Using an ordered probit model with sample selection, Su found a consistent and positive relationship between democratic support and endorsement of transitional justice measures. Citizens who expressed stronger belief in democracy were more likely to support truth investigations, prosecution of perpetrators, and the removal of authoritarian symbols from public spaces.
Interestingly, support for victim compensation showed no statistically significant relationship. Su explained that this may be because compensation policies were introduced as early as 1995, meaning the public now views them as routine rather than transformative. By contrast, newer measures such as the settlement of ill-gotten party assets and the removal of statues and symbols associated with authoritarian rule remain politically salient. Su’s analysis also revealed that factors such as partisanship, national identity, and attitudes toward unification or independence influence both willingness to respond and degree of support. He emphasized that future research on transitional justice must account for these contextual variables, which shape how societies interpret accountability, fairness, and reconciliation.
Ultimately, Su argued that transitional justice is more than a backward-looking exercise. It is a measure of democratic endurance. Policies that promote truth, recognition, and accountability sustain civic trust and reinforce collective memory. They ensure that democracy in Taiwan is not only procedural but also moral.
A Complicated Landscape
Tsai described East Asia as a “complicated geopolitical landscape” shaped by intersecting alliances and domestic politics. The United States, he said, acts as “the most important outside insider.” Taiwan, in turn, remains “one leg in and one leg out,” balancing its security partnerships and informal diplomatic networks. China and North Korea, he noted, behave as strategic partners, though not formal allies. Regional actors such as Japan and South Korea face similar balancing challenges as they navigate U.S. security guarantees and economic ties with China.
Professor Su’s research adds an important domestic dimension to this regional picture. While Tsai traced how states balance power externally, Su demonstrated how societies sustain legitimacy internally. His analysis of transitional justice policies showed that Taiwan’s democratic resilience depends on citizens’ continued support for accountability, truth-seeking, and the removal of authoritarian symbols. Just as East Asian governments balance alliances and autonomy, Taiwanese citizens engage in their own form of political balancing of reconciling historical memory with democratic consolidation. Su’s findings suggest that Taiwan’s capacity to navigate external complexity is inseparable from the stability of its civic norms and collective trust at home.
In the Q&A discussion, a participant referenced Graham Allison’s “Destined for War”, asking whether technological rivalry could generate unintended escalation. While Tsai concluded that the likelihood of war is low, he noted that the tech war is reshaping regional alignments. Japan’s and South Korea’s efforts to balance alliance commitments with economic interests exemplify this dynamic. Tsai underscored the importance of distinguishing between geo-economics and geopolitics, noting that policy decisions increasingly determine resource allocation “instead of what the market wants.” Increased interdependence has not produced deeper cooperation. Instead, national industrial policies have become the primary instruments shaping regional order. The semiconductor industry thus represents a convergence of power, institutions, and norms.
Taken together, Tsai’s and Su’s analyses situate Taiwan within a wider transformation of the East Asian order. In Tsai’s account, Taiwan demonstrates how power, institutions, and norms intersect in the global economy. The semiconductor industry illustrates how industrial policy and cross-border interdependence are now key to understanding regional interaction. Examining Su’s research, Taiwan’s transitional justice experience reveals how democratic commitment sustains the credibility of political institutions long after formal democratization.
These perspectives complement one another. Taiwan’s material contributions to the region’s technology networks are inseparable from the political values that underpin its domestic governance. Reassessing Taiwan’s place in East Asia requires understanding how the endurance of its democratic values and the reach of its technological innovation together shape the region’s evolving order.
The seminar was hosted by Dr. Bo-jiun Jing, Senior Research Fellow and Programme Manager in Taiwan Studies at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies. It forms part of the Oxford Taiwan Studies Seminar Series and this recap was produced in partnership between the Oxford Taiwan Studies Programme and St Antony’s International Review (STAIR).
