Impacts of the Ban on Asylum Seekers' Employment

Yu Furukawa

Many countries with asylum processes have adopted policies which restrict the access of asylum seekers to the labour market. For example, in the UK, asylum seekers are largely prohibited from working, although they can apply for a permit to work if they have been awaiting a decision for 12 months and are not considered responsible for the delay [1]. Granting asylum seekers, a work permit means allowing them to engage in paid and formal employment either at the time of application or after a certain period has elapsed. The granting of work permits to asylum seekers takes various forms, primarily distinguished by:

1. The duration asylum seekers must wait for the work permit to be approved.

2. The presence of a list of job restrictions that asylum seekers are allowed to engage in.

I evaluate the validity of the argument that supporting the employment of asylum seekers working would act as a ‘pull factor,’ for migrants, and also assess the impacts to the economies of host societies, as well as the well-being and integration of those with asylum.

Debunking the 'Pull Factor' Assumption for Asylum Seeker Migration

The common argument against allowing asylum seekers to work is that it might serve as a 'pull factor' for undocumented migration and asylum applications. However, the validity of this argument is questionable because it lacks counterfactual analysis [2], thereby failing to account for the various other factors influencing undocumented migration and asylum applications. It could be argued that irregular migration and asylum applications would have increased even without the ban on asylum seekers working.

This argument is further challenged by the fact that some asylum applicants are unaware of the challenges they will face in the labour market prior to migration or asylum application. One study [3] showed that, out of 246 asylum seekers surveyed, 72% were unaware prior to arriving in the UK that asylum seekers are not allowed to work. This data suggests that other significant factors influence migratory decision making beyond knowledge of work permits, such as the presence of family members and migrant communities, and host language proficiency. Additionally, research indicates that asylum applications experience a negligible decrease if at all when the unemployment rate increases or when a ban on working is established. For instance, Zetter et al. (2003) [4] noted that restrictions on work and welfare were introduced in Germany during the 1980s, yet applications increased and peaked in 1992.

Therefore, viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull factor’ mistakenly assumes that migrants possess comprehensive knowledge about their economic rights prior to their journey and overlooks more complex dynamics in migratory decision-making, such as household dynamics, historical context, and transnational networks. To grasp these complexities and identify the accurate 'pull factor' and 'push factor', the combination of counterfactual analysis and qualitative research in origin countries and along migratory routes is advisable [5]. Depending on migrants' circumstances and social factors, there may be cases where a work permit can become a 'pull factor'. However, at the very least, it is advisable to be skeptical towards claims that it is an absolute 'pull factor'.

Unless there is a change in the structural factors driving in undocumented migration, asylum seekers will continue to arrive, even if work permits are granted to asylum seekers. Therefore, while simultaneously considering policies aimed at reducing undocumented migration, such as expanding legal and safe migration pathways, it is more feasible to encourage the employment of asylum seekers and mitigate their burden on the social welfare system, as I will discuss later.

Another Form of “Illegality”: Undocumented Stay and Work After the Asylum Refusal

While it is doubtful or at best context-specific about whether work permits can be a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented entry, the issuance of work permits can lead to other forms of undocumented behaviour. In other words, it may contribute to neglect of the option of voluntary or forced return (removal). Allowing asylum seekers to work could strengthen their ties to the host country and make the prospect of returning less appealing [6]. Consequently, they might remain in the country even after their asylum claims have been rejected, without any legal authorization for residence or work.

This situation is sometimes addressed through the implementation of policies such as the one introduced in Sweden, where work permits are exchanged for a commitment to return in the event of asylum refusal [7]. By ensuring cooperation regarding return in the event of failed asylum claims, individuals can secure a work permit during the asylum process. This measure serves to deter undocumented stays and work following the refusal of asylum.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts of allowing asylum seekers to enter the formal sector need to be evaluated from two perspectives: (i) the extent to which asylum seekers will make fiscal contributions to host societies and (ii) the extent to which the inflow of asylum seekers into the labour market will create competition with native workers. Asylum seeker participation in the labour market may yield short-term economic benefits. Lift the Ban (2020) [8] estimates that if half of asylum seekers awaiting asylum decisions for over six months were allowed to work full-time at the national average wage, the British government could gain £73.1 million annually from their tax and national insurance contributions. However, it is important to consider the degree to which asylum seekers will make net fiscal contributions, paying more in taxes than the costs of providing them with welfare benefits and public services. Given that refugees are less likely to make fiscal contributions than other migrants [9], asylum seekers are likely to follow the same trend.

Another aspect to consider is that granting work permits to asylum seekers may negatively impact native workers' employment and wages by creating competition between them. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) [10] found reduced native employment due to inflows of East German migrants to West Germany post-World War II. Also, Bahar et al. (2021) [11] observed negligible labour market effects in Colombia following a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented Venezuelan migrants, except for minor impacts on formal employment.  While these case studies do not specifically address asylum seeker situations, they can provide a rationale for governments to limit job options for asylum seekers and regulate the influx of asylum seekers into specific labour markets. Directing asylum seekers toward sectors facing labour shortages and where competition with native workers is unlikely might help mitigate adverse effects on the employment and wages of native workers.

However, the ability of asylum seekers to work does not always have a negative impact on native workers. This is because it depends on how many asylum seekers end up working. Asylum seekers often have difficulty finding a job and earning wages that are correspondent to their educational levels. According to a survey conducted by Lift the Ban (2020), 74% of respondents (UK asylum seekers) have secondary-level education or higher, and 37% have a university degree, which is only 5% lower than that of the rest of the UK [12]. Despite their educational attainment, they struggle to secure employment opportunities. According to the same survey, of the thirty-six people who applied for work permits after waiting for over 12 months, only eight were granted permission, and only two of them managed to find employment afterwards [13].

This result resonates with larger-scale data in 2022 from the Migration Observatory, which indicates that non-EU-born asylum seekers in the UK were more likely to be unemployed than those who migrated for employment, family, or study. While the unemployment rate among the former was 12%, it ranged among the latter from 2 to 6 per cent [14]. Moreover, even if asylum seekers secure employment, it takes time for them to earn wages commensurate with their educational level or equivalent to other types of migrants. For example, research shows that while the employment gap between asylum seekers and other types of migrants converges over time, those in weekly earnings and hourly wages do not narrow [15].

In sum, although granting work permits to asylum seekers may cause competition between them and native workers, it is crucial to keep in mind that asylum seekers would struggle to find a job. Therefore, how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make should be considered.

Psychological and Social Impact

Access to the labour market can have a positive impact on the mental health of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers often experience insecurity about their future and a sense of being stuck due to pending asylum cases. However, engaging in purposeful activities such as work might help them address these concerns [16]. Being able to work may facilitate the integration of asylum seekers including economic dependence, the improvement of living standards and social integration [17]. One study [18], through its interviews with refugees and migrants in the UK, demonstrated that most of them (the exact number was not specified) view work as a key component of integration. They perceive work as enabling them to establish the foundation for their livelihood. While the data presented is not solely limited to asylum seekers, it would be reasonable to assume that the findings also apply to asylum seekers.

Furthermore, granting work permits to asylum seekers can have a positive impact on other elements of integration such as the acquisition of language skills, and cultural values. For example, one survey [19] asked 207 migrants about the place where they learn the most about the British community and values, with 43% saying from the workplace, 15% from neighbourhood and community, and 15% from mainstream media. Here, it is crucial to consider how temporal and cumulative impact the integration of asylum seekers into the workforce. As Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2021) [20] argue, when asylum seekers face prolonged periods with limited access to jobs, their economic integration slows down.

Marbach et al. (2017) [21] conducted a study in Germany where a court decision led to a shorter employment ban period. They found that, five years after the waiting period was reduced, refugees who initially had to wait an extra seven months before entering the job market had employment rates about 20 percentage points lower. In this sense, it is advisable to allow asylum seekers to work at an early stage of their application if governments want to facilitate the successful integration of asylum workers into society

Conclusion

Viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented migration and asylum applications overlooks situations where other factors play more significant roles. The exact effect of work permits, and the complex dynamics of migratory decision-making require counterfactual and qualitative analysis. To evaluate its economic impact, it is imperative to consider how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make. Regarding psychological and integration aspects, access to the labour market can have a favourable impact on asylum seekers' mental health and facilitate their integration into society if they are permitted to work early in the application process.

References

1. Gower, M., McKinney, C. and Meade, L. (2019). Should asylum seekers have unrestricted rights to work in the UK? UK Parliament [online] Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01908/.

2. Walsh, P.W. and Sumption, M. (2023). UK policies to deter people from claiming asylum. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum/.

3. Lift the Ban (2020). Lift the ban: Why giving people seeking asylum the right to work is common sense. London: Lift the Ban Coalition.

4. Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, Silva Ferretti, Martyn Pearl (2003) ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Asylum Policies in Europe 1990- 2000’, Home Office Research Study 259;

5. Walsh and Sumption supra reference 2.

6. Valenta, M. and Thorshaug, K. (2013). Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 20(3), pp.459–482. doi:https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02003006.

7. Migrationsverket (2023). Asylum seekers who have a job. [online] www.migrationsverket.se. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Working-in-Sweden/Employed/If-you-are-in-Sweden/Asylum-seekers-who-have-a-job.html

8. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

9. Migration Observatory. (2023). Why the government’s economic Impact Assessment of the Illegal Migration Act tells us little about the Act’s economic impact. [online] Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/why-the-governments-economic-impact-assessment-of-the-illegal-migration-act-tells-us-little-about-the-acts-economic-impact/.

10. Braun, S. and Omar Mahmoud, T. (2014). The Employment Effects of Immigration: Evidence from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany. The Journal of Economic History, 74(1), pp.69–108. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050714000035.

11. Bahar, D., Ibáñez, A.M. and Rozo, S.V. (2021). Give me your tired and your poor: Impact of a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented refugees. Journal of Development Economics, 151, p.102652. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102652.

12. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

13. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

14. Fernández-Reino, M. and Rienzo, C. (2024). Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview - Migration Observatory. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-labour-market-an-overview/.

15. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2017). Differences in Labour Market Outcomes between Natives, Refugees and Other Migrants in the UK. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920574.

16. Burnett, A. and Ndovi, T. (2018). The health of forced migrants. BMJ, p.k4200. doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k4200.

17. Kierans, D. (2021). Integration in the UK: Understanding the Data. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/integration-in-the-uk-understanding-the-data/.

18. Rutter, J., Latorre, M., and Sriskandarajah, D. (2008). Beyond naturalisation: citizenship policy in an age of super mobility, London: IPPR.

19. Migrants Resource Centre. (2018). Integrated Communities Strategy: MRC submission of evidence and response to the government green paper consultation

20. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2021). What Works for Improving Refugee Outcomes in High-Income Countries? Policy Insights for the UK. [online] The Centre on Migration, Policy & Society (COMPAS). Available at: https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-Works-for-Improving-Refugee-Outcomes-in-High-Income-Countries-Policy-Insights-for-the-UK.pdf.

21. Marbach, M., Hainmueller, J. and Hangartner, D. (2017). The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078172.

The Necessity of Cluster Bombs in Ukraine’s Fight Against Russia

Autumn Perkey

At a café bombing on Oct. 5, 2023, 49 Ukrainians were killed. Ukrainian air defenses remain weak, and the continued Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure have damaged the electric grid and water supply in critical areas. Future aid packages need to be approved as swiftly as possible, and they should include any means necessary to defend against Russian adversaries, including cluster munitions. 

In July 2023, the U.S. sent a military aid package worth over $800 million, sent at a point in time when the Ukrainians were running out of options, including access to the necessary resources to defend. Amongst the aid sent, this included cluster munitions. Debates have arisen about whether the United States should send cluster munitions to aid in the fight against the Russian invasion. While there are considerable moral consequences and debates about their uses, Ukraine needs an aggressive aid package including the means to defend, which includes the use of cluster munitions. The aggression demonstrated by Russian forces warrants sending military aid packages that include any means necessary to assure Ukrainian defense, including sending the debated cluster munitions.

123 countries including the UK and Spain have outlawed cluster bombs, signing what’s known as the Convention on Cluster Munitions established in 2010, due to the potential harm to civilians. This can happen when the bombs land incorrectly or the fuse does not function properly. 

When the smaller bombs are released, they pose a risk of indiscriminately killing over a wide area. However, these bombs are not banned by the countries directly involved in the decision to use them, the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine. Russian forces have already been using cluster bombs in Ukraine, and the Russian counterparts have a failure rate of 30-40%. However, the failure rate of U.S. cluster bombs is only 1-2%. While there is a risk to civilians due to the potential failure rate, effective bomb damage assessment will help reduce these risks while providing necessary support against Russian atrocities. Balancing the use of cluster munitions with the protection of civilians is difficult, but in 2021 there were no reported deaths from initial cluster attacks. 

While effective bomb damage assessment may limit the collateral harm caused by cluster bombs, as of 2008 the United States has stopped producing them. Cluster munitions are not ideal against all targets, for example, standard unitary warheads are more effective against point targets like buildings. The use of cluster munitions by Ukraine has been limited in capacity. In their first use in March of 2022, Ukraine forces used cluster munitions near Husarivka, an agricultural village, near Russian military headquarters. During this strike, there were no reported deaths, and the target was a military one. In comparison, Russia has indiscriminately used cluster bombs throughout Ukraine leading to hundreds of civilian casualties. According to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) estimates between February to July 2022, there have been at least 689 civilian casualties due to cluster bombs most likely associated with Russia’s indiscriminate use or when used improperly within cities are densely populated areas.  

As of 2021 149 civilians were harmed by cluster munitions worldwide. This statistic focuses on their use in urban areas, where the overall risk of collateral damage is always higher and is not their intended use. Feedback from the frontlines has asserted that rather than using the cluster bombs indiscriminately, Ukrainian forces have been using them effectively and targeted to break through Russian defenses. The areas in which these bombs are being used are cluttered with Russian antitank, antipersonnel mines and trip wires focusing on a military target, rather than civilian infrastructure and populated areas. 

In Ukraine, the case for using cluster munitions is strong. According to U.N.-backed investigations, there is proof of significant Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The original airstrike in Mariupol in 2022 killed hundreds huddled inside a theater. Along with this are the numerous strikes Russia has repeated against Ukrainian infrastructure leading to leaving civilians without heat and electricity during some of the coldest months. These direct abuses against international law, do not even begin to account for the widespread use of torture towards non-combatants by Russian forces, including women and children. 

From February 24, 2022, to August 13, 2023, 26,384 civilian casualties have been reported in Ukraine. At least 9,444 civilians died during the Russian invasion as well as 16,940 being injured. While these are the known deaths and injuries, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights of the United Nations anticipates that the actual numbers are much higher. Numerous civilian atrocities have occurred justifying the U.S. sending the debated cluster bombs back in July of 2023. The continued Russian terrorism, such as the October 5 strike warrants future aid packages that contain any means necessary for Ukrainian defense. These atrocities are unacceptable and warrant the use of the extreme bombs that were sent. While cluster bombs are outlawed by 123 countries, the potential harm of inaction necessitates the risk taken. Further delays in military support through back stocked cluster munitions, will likely lead to more humanitarian abuses by Russian forces, including the torture of civilians. 

Overall, Russian cluster munitions fail 169-176% more than the counterparts sent to aid Ukrainians. The failure rate, meaning the likelihood of unexploded bomblets remaining after a cluster bomb is launched, has come back from Ukraine at 2.35 percent, while this is not at the expected threshold of 1-2%, it is still significantly lower than the cluster bombs being deployed by Russian forces (30-40% failure rate). While the UK, Spain, and Canada have spoken out against the U.S. decision to send the cluster bombs, Germany’s president has said that he understands the U.S. decision and it should not be blocked. While Germany still defends its position against the use of cluster bombs in general, the statement has been made that if Ukraine no longer has the means to defend itself, it will mean the end of the country. In the case of the U.S.-sent cluster bombs, the ends necessarily justify the means. 

Currently, the Ukrainians are halted from pushing back the Russian adversaries in the eastern Donetsk region. Valergy Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s military commander-in-chief has attributed the halt to a lack of adequate firepower to break through Russian defenses. Additionally, this effort has been supported by Ukrainian President Zelensky as much-needed military aid. 

Feedback from Ukraine as of July 2023 to the White House is that the cluster munitions were being used quite effectively to push back Russian forces. While it is unlikely this weapon alone will lead to a victory, the reality is that to counter Russian utility and capability these tools are a necessary means to an end. The additional limitations exist in the fact that there are no other readily available weapons to provide the type of support cluster munitions can provide. Currently, the supply of cannon artillery that acts similarly to a fuse is at an all-time low, as well as the supply of MLRS rockets (which are currently out of production and have been for some time). 

Within two weeks of the first cluster munitions aid package, the fighting in Kupiansk remained rough, but with the benefit of additional tools of warfare, Ukrainian forces were able to hold the line against the Russian forces attempting to seek territory by targeting Russian armored vehicles. Kupiansk has been undergoing a regular bombardment of Russian artillery for months and is at risk of civilian death and collateral damage if Russian forces continue their advance upon the city. Cluster munitions can be used to deter the takeover of the city and possibly prevent and deter Russian bombardment and abuses. 

Critics of the cluster bombs are dealing with a primarily moral dilemma while ignoring the implications of war. The Ukrainians are fighting to survive against an immoral force and need to match capabilities to protect Ukrainian civilians during a brutish invasion. The reality we face is a tradeoff between providing military assistance to a population that is being tortured, raped, and victimized, or allowing the adversary to maintain an upper hand. Providing military aid may often be limited by what munitions remain in stock, if that option is limited to cluster munitions, and they are used effectively, it is better than no support at all as a defensively Ukraine will lead to a stronger Russian opposition which has proven a threat to civilians and civilian infrastructure. 

Canada and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

michael levinson | News Editor

Former Canadian Senator Douglas Roche spoke bluntly on Canada’s refusal to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). “No wonder Canada didn’t get elected to the UN Security Council.”

Roche echoes a growing refrain that includes the New Democratic Party (NDP), Green Party, Bloc Québécois, as well as notable Canadian politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Jean Chrétien, all urging Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to sign the treaty. But Trudeau remains defiant. He deemed the UN conference which devised it “sort of useless,” instructed Canada’s UN delegation to boycott the negotiations, and continually asserts that Canada’s NATO membership precludes its participation.

Is it unbecoming for Canada — the nation which spearheaded the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and one of the most steadfast historical advocates for non-proliferation — to resist these pressures? Seventy-three percent of Canadians think so. But even for doves, the answer should be “no”.

The TPNW’s ban on nuclear weapons does not serve Canadian interests because it would weaken the US’ ability to deter nuclear threats that protects Canadians and democracies at large. Research suggests that when leaders ignore the TPNW it does little to quell public pressures to sign. Trudeau should plainly address Canadians and set the record straight. He should acknowledge that the broad-based effort to ban nuclear weapons is well-intentioned but falls short due to its potential to limit deterrence mechanisms that have helped avoid a nuclear winter. Finally, Trudeau should explain that an outright ban helps even the field for revisionist powers such as North Korea to take advantage of a potential nuclear void.

In this new kind of prisoner’s dilemma, the TPNW places a greater onus on democratic states to disarm than authoritarian ones. But ‘taking the high road’ is not admirable — it is reckless. Canada must instead regain credibility on disarmament by focusing its efforts on encouraging the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, aims to stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where they no longer pose a viable threat. To achieve this, state parties agree to never develop, transfer, or in any way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those that already have nuclear weapons must work towards their “irreversible elimination.” 

The TPNW can be seen as a good faith but idealistic way to deal with frustrations regarding the flagship treaty on nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A product of détente during the Cold War, the NPT permits the five UN Security Council veto states — the US, UK, France, China, and Russia — to keep their nuclear stockpiles with certain restraints. The rest give up their right to nuclear weapons entirely and agree to specific safeguards on nuclear energy. The NPT has been successful in limiting proliferation; there is an adage that most states comply with their treaty obligations most of the time. Overall, the NPT has made it less appealing and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the pace of nuclear disarmament has been abysmal. The US and Russia have a combined 11,000 nuclear warheads, enough to end the world many times over. However, “if the sole goal of the global nuclear order were to avoid nuclear use, the obvious solution would be abolition.” Rather, nuclear-armed states believe nuclear weapons provide security in a challenging strategic environment. For instance, Canada’s involvement in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NATO, place it firmly within the US’ nuclear umbrella. Security guarantees, like those given to Canada by the US, have been shown to reduce the possibility of a state otherwise acquiring weapons on their own. While the NPT still espouses complete disarmament as a goal, it is premised on the idea that a nuclear hierarchy among states, or a global nuclear order, “has done its part to help keep the world from going over the precipice.”

Some supporters of the TPNW maintain that though opposition to the treaty is predictable, its overall effect is to give rise to a ‘nuclear taboo’ that will become so powerful it will soon be customary international law. If this is the primary mechanism through which the world gives up on nuclear politics entirely, it is doomed to fail. Customary international law (which applies to all states irrespective of treaty obligations) does not develop simply when a practice is widespread. For it to materialize, it must also satisfy opinion juris: meaning a state is engaging in that practice because it is believed to be international law. As Chatham House opined, “this is far from an automatic process […] even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence — so-called persistent objectors — will not be bound by it.”

Other supporters of the TPNW concede that while achieving a complete ban of nuclear weapons is unlikely, a universal treaty that is not accepted by nuclear-weapons states is better than none. The University of Melbourne’s Maria Rost Rublee, for instance, argues that while the landmine ban treaty has not been ratified by the US, the US has not deployed them for two decades. In that case, the normative power of the treaty has superseded its lack of universality.

But landmines are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, their catastrophic effects are increasingly understood, mutually assured destruction looms large, and they are rarely embedded in conventional forces. Writing about Russia’s recent nuclear threats to Ukraine, Alexander Bollfrass said “fortunately, the foundation of international nuclear governance is more robust than is often assumed.” The NPT, for example, is complemented by various arms-control agreements, extended deterrence arrangements, and expectations of negative reinforcements like sanctions if nuclear norms are violated.

Given no nuclear-armed states have signed the TPNW, it will only serve to limit deterrence in practice. And as authoritarian states such as Russia and China are more immune to public pressures than democracies, it will primarily affect Western states’ deterrence capabilities. North Korea seems to have recognized this, voting in favour of establishing a formal UN mandate to commence negotiations for the TPNW in 2016. Kim Jong Un is taking advantage of our democratic processes — he is playing the West for a fool.

In several NATO countries, over 75% of respondents said they support the TPNW. If this support is translated in the ballot box, leaders will eventually give in. What would that mean? Contrary to what Justin Trudeau has claimed, there is a growing body of research showing that NATO members are not barred from signing the TPNW but must commit to giving up nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. So if a NATO member becomes a party to the TPNW, it would have to forfeit key defensive arrangements. Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, all host US warheads. While housing these weapons in Europe is a relic of Cold War strategy, “withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond.” And as the war in Ukraine continues, some say that the weapons can be used as leverage in negotiations with Russia.

Further, although Canada does not house nuclear weapons, the TPNW’s prohibition of its members to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party,” may undermine Canada’s involvement in NORAD. The NORAD air defense agreement is premised on the fact that regardless of the speed of the disarmament process, “large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long-range aircraft capable of striking North America.” This fundamentally practical alliance will be effectively destroyed by signing the TPNW.

Increasing public pressure on democracies to sign the TPNW also comes at a time when North Korea is testing longer-range ballistic missiles, Iran remains a threshold power on the precipice of a bomb, China is developing its nuclear triad, and Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities with state-of-the-art hypersonic glide vehicles. It is unwise to cede the upper hand. To re-establish Canada’s credibility on nuclear disarmament while avoiding the TPNW, therefore, Trudeau should encourage the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals. Or, as was suggested for Japan (which is facing similar pressures to sign), Trudeau should make it a priority to invest heavily in a specific aspect of nuclear security, such as improving safeguards on nuclear energy.

Whatever the response, Trudeau must not ignore the TPNW — it is here to stay and is only gaining more momentum. It would also be prudent to continue to engage with UN conferences and TPNW meetings to further demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment to multilateralism.

That means embracing Canada’s diplomatic tradition, responsibly.

Empowering India's Sustainable Development: The Crucial Role of Hemp

Khushi Maheshwari and Pratham Maheshwari

Humanity continues to endure catastrophic environmental damage. 2023 was the warmest year on record by far and the Doomsday clock is set at just 90 seconds to midnight. In such dire circumstances, even a glimmering hope can prove to be a blessing. Indeed, hope can be found at the literal grassroots in the form of a surprising commodity - hemp - in the world’s most populous country, India.

Hemp’s value can be best realized in a country best suited to become a world leader in its wider proliferation: India. Hemp has 25,000 proven applications ranging from textiles to food. It also flourishes without a heavy reliance on pesticides and fertilizers, and overall is a relatively low maintenance, and therefore agriculturally cost-effective, crop. Hemp can yield 3-8 tones of fiber in a single acre, 4 times that of an average forest while producing 25 times more oxygen. It is also a carbon-negative crop that absorbs carbon dioxide from the environment, with each kilogram of hemp absorbing 1.8-2 kilograms of carbon dioxide. It requires less than half the amount of water required to produce cotton, and rather than absorbing nutrients from the soil, hemp returns 60-70% of nutrients to the soil, promoting its future fertility. Hemp is also blessed with a brief crop cycle of approximately 12 weeks. One of the strongest natural fibers, hemp textile fiber is known to be biodegradable, hypoallergenic, antimicrobial, porous, durable, breathable, and comfortable, and can also help to regulate body temperature as it facilitates air to circulate around our skin when compared to other fabrics.

The global hemp fiber market is expected to reach 26 billion dollars by 2026 and the global medical hemp market is projected to exceed 82 billion dollars during the ensuing year. Capturing such a rapidly growing market and becoming a global leader in the industry  could do wonders for India. Hemp production is greatly needed to address issues such as unemployment, water scarcity, and limited availability of land; in the latter case, hemp has been heralded as a pristine candidate to repair damaged Indian soil through the process of phytoremediation.

Moreover, the use of hemp has roots in Ayurveda, a school of Indian alternative medicine. In the counterpart school of Atharvaveda, hemp is considered one of the five most sacred plants. Hemp was widely used in ancient India due to its medicinal and nutritional value. It was also used in textiles and even as hempcrete to construct the famous Ellora Caves, which has prevented their degradation for 1500 years. 

The regulation of hemp in India began during the colonial era when cannabis was restricted across British colonies. The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission (1894-1895) criminalized and suppressed cannabis cultivation and processing. Currently, hemp is regulated by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, of 1985, which was passed by the Rajiv Gandhi administration under the influence of the American Reagan administration for over two decades. The act legally defined hemp as cannabis due to the taxonomical origin of hemp flowers from the same family of plants as marijuana. This proved an impetus for taboos, myths, and misconceptions about hemp. Hemp, however, crucially lacks the psychoactive effects of marijuana when consumed. Marijuana arises from a female Sativa plant containing psychoactive tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that is consumed for recreational purposes. Hemp contains less than 0.3% THC. Still, the narrative of suspicion persists in the minds of Indian consumers.

The peculiar intensity of the Indian taboo against hemp is evinced by the country’s seemingly contradictory relationship to bhang, a plant prepared from the seeds and leaves of the cannabis plant, which is legal in India. Regulated by some states, it is used as a form of medicine and also enjoyed in festivals. Its origins trace back thousands of years when Cannabis Indica was used to worship Lord Shiva. A plausible explanation is that bhang is shielded from disrepute by its holy connotations. In a country imbued with strongly held religious beliefs and a strong commitment by many to India’s unique and storied traditions, hemp has slipped through the cracks, its rich heritage tainted by a perception imported from colonizers.

COP 28 recognised significant Indian environmental achievements, including progress toward a 33% reduction in emissions and the achievement of Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets 11 years ahead of schedule. India has also greatly expanded its electric grid capacity, sourcing 80% from non-petrocarbon resources. However, COP 28 had nary a whisper about hemp. India is a land of manufacturers and businessmen who can capitalise on hemp, advancing environmental targets, bringing attendant international renown to India, and thereby building a pivotal point for India by making it a sustainable land and potentially generating a trillion dollar market for the Indian economy.

Legalization could be a first, normative, and positive step. Stereotypes must be combated by educating communities and spreading awareness. With widespread cultivation, India would not only benefit from an environmental surplus but also achieve economies of scale. A rational approach to structural change must, in this case, start at the top. However, the relationship between social narratives and policymaking is frustratingly circular, requiring courageous effort to break the chain of stigma and suppression of a potentially vital industry.